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When does Medici hurt DaVinci?  
Mitigating the Signaling Effect of Extraneous Stakeholder Relationships in 
the Field of Cultural Production 
	  
ABSTRACT 
Does corporate philanthropy have an indiscriminately positive effect on recipients? Our baseline 
argument asserts that relationships with stakeholders outside the field, such as corporate donors, can be 
perceived as a deviation from the dominant logic at the industry level, and thus as a negative signal by 
peers. How can recipients mitigate this adverse effect on social evaluations? To answer this question 
we study how corporate benefaction affects the process of peer recognition in the context of Russian 
theaters (2004-2011). Firstly, we engage in a qualitative exploration of our setting to contextualize our 
hypotheses and understand how relationships with corporate donors, depending on their characteristics, 
affect peer recognition. We then quantitatively test our hypotheses and confirm that the salience of the 
relationship with extraneous stakeholders - operationalized as the number of corporate donors - has a 
negative effect on peer recognition. This effect however can be mitigated if theaters choose to limit the 
breadth, depth and negative valence of the relationship. We contribute to both the institutional logics 
and stakeholder literature by bringing in a signaling perspective: we show that peer recognition, upon 
which the maintenance of a dominant logic lies, is directly impacted by the nature of relationships with 
extraneous stakeholders.  
Key Words:  
Corporate philanthropy, stakeholder relationships, institutional logics, signaling, cultural organizations.	  
	  
INTRODUCTION 
Sociological and historical work on the evolution of creative industries reveals that the activities 
of cultural organizations and the private economic sector are deeply intertwined (e.g. Bourdieu, 1993; 
DiMaggio & Mukhtar, 2004; Durand et al., 2013). In the light of contemporary political and ideological 
changes, an increasing number of cultural producers have reinforced their ties with private benefactors. 
However, the consequences of partnerships between business and the arts have also been a topic of 
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ardent debate among policy makers, artistic communities and the general public (Miller & Yudice, 
2002). The relevance of studying this question is even more evident today, as national governments are 
less able to financially support culture while encouraging corporate social responsibility as a new model 
for community development. While the management literature has posited the beneficial impact of 
philanthropy on donors (Porter & Kramer, 2002), it has also implied by extension that recipients are 
better off when they receive corporate money. Notwithstanding the attempts of the existing literature to 
identify several mechanisms by which corporate involvement may affect actors within cultural fields, 
it fails to provide an understanding of how it conditions evaluation of those actors by outside parties. 
This paper offers a novel and nuanced look at the impact of private firms’ contributions on arts 
organizations, in particular by studying the effects of corporate benefaction on the perception of 
beneficiaries by their peers, a key group of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders can affect organizations in various ways, among which the provision of resources 
constitutes one of their vital roles (Frooman, 1999; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). Management 
scholars have only begun explaining how these different influences are interrelated (Hillman, et al., 
2009). Stakeholders’ perception and behavior towards focal organizations are deeply intertwined 
(Rowley, 1997). To capture the nature of these interactions, it is important to distinguish stakeholders 
within and outside the social space in which recipients function (Bourdieu, 1993; Thomson, 2014). 	  
Indeed, stakeholders can be either located within an organizational field - in that they share a common 
meaning system and activity with the focal organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2013) - or 
they can be situated outside. Both sets of stakeholders might have legitimate claims over the 
organization’s behavior, but these claims are likely to pull the organization in two different directions. 
On one side, field-level stakeholders grant legitimacy and expect organizations to follow the rules of 
their most proximate social space (Oliver, 1991). On the other side, stakeholders outside the field are 
estranged from such rules and may pressure organizations to behave differently from field norms 
(Neville, Bell & Whitwell, 2011).  
Considering the importance of field-level norms in understanding the interrelatedness of 
stakeholders, theorizing the effect of the multiplicity of internal and external expectations requires 
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blending stakeholder theory and institutional theory (Rowley, 1997; Doh & Guay, 2006). While 
previous work in these streams of literature has looked at how institutions affect relationships with 
stakeholders (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; Doh & Guay, 2006), scholars of both traditions have accorded 
considerably less attention to studying the influence of stakeholder relationships as a form of adherence 
to – or deviance from – institutionalized norms. Such norms are derived from field-level logics that 
structure and guide decision making of field actors (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton, Lounsbury & 
Ocasio, 2012). Adherence to an established logic ostensibly produces legitimacy; in many fields, a 
professional evaluation and subsequently the reputation of a field actor greatly depend on the degree of 
adherence to established norms and canons that constitute the dominant logic (Glynn & Lounsbury, 
2005). 
In this study, we focus on how connections established with stakeholders outside the field 
distance organizations from the dominant logic of their professional field in the eyes of proximate 
stakeholders, ultimately affecting peer evaluation. We investigate how the relationship with a specific 
stakeholder group outside the field, namely corporate donors, affects an organization’s evaluation by 
its peers – an evaluation typically dependent upon the respect of field-level norms. One crucial type of 
resource provided by peers is acclaim legitimacy (Bourdieu, 1993) or peer recognition (Cattani, Ferriani 
& Allison, 2014). This social endorsement rewards organizations at the core of the field and grants the 
power “to implement [their] ideas and gain the visibility necessary for them to be recognized as 
valuable” (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008: 825). In cultural fields, social evaluations are only marginally 
based on an objective observation of quality (Salganik et al., 2006) which makes reliance on signals 
necessary because key attributes are unobservable (Spence, 1973). In the meantime, receivers of the 
signal – the evaluating peers - focus on the elements they can directly associate with the quality they 
are trying to assess (Sanders & Boivie, 2004).  
The case of arts organizations adds an important normative dimension to this signaling 
phenomenon due to the unique professional ethos of the cultural field that defines and substantiates 
itself through an open disavowal of economic dispositions and commercial utilitarianism (Bourdieu, 
1993). This “economic disinterestedness” constitutes the normative essence of cultural field’s core logic 
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and marks the frontier that separates “art” from “entertainment” in the eyes of its professionals (Anheier, 
Gerhards & Romo, 1995). Bourdieu (1993) insists that “authenticity” as a marker of artistic value in 
the field of cultural production is strongly associated with the actor’s endorsement of its peculiar 
normative orientation, most vividly manifested in its conspicuous indifference to economic imperatives 
(what Bourdieu calls the “disavowal of the economy”). The proximity to the core of the field relies on 
the organization’s willingness to follow the field’s normative expectations (Lamont, 2012) and the 
dominant logic (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005). Thus, displaying a relationship with corporate stakeholders 
is associated with commercial interests and may be perceived to be at odds with the ethos of artistic 
occupation (Schwartz, 1997). This, in turn, may be viewed as a sign that the organization is distancing 
itself from the core of the field, which will subsequently result in lower peer recognition (Cattani et al., 
2014). 
While the cultural organizations that reach out to corporate donors are aware of the negative 
consequences in terms of peer evaluation and field-level legitimacy, we argue that this negative signal 
can be managed and mitigated. Previous research demonstrates that organizations can actively 
manipulate their relationship with stakeholders to deal with the multiple pressures they face (Oliver, 
1991; Rowley, 1997). When establishing ties with corporate donors, decisions need to be made with 
regard to the forms of association and commitment (Brammer & Millington, 2005). While some 
characteristics of the benefactor-beneficiary relationship may not necessarily be visible to any other 
members of the organizational field, the number and identity of the donors, the modes of collaboration, 
as well as the longevity of the ties between benefactors and recipient organizations are usually public 
information (Boerner & Jobst, 2011). We argue that a stakeholder relationship can be characterized by 
three salient features: (i) the breadth of the relationship (the pervasiveness of the association) (ii) the 
depth of the relationship (the longevity of the involvement) (iii) the valence of the relationship (to which 
extent the relationship carries positive or negative emotions). These elements convey key information 
with regards to the nature of relationship and can ultimately moderate the signal sent to other 
stakeholders. The characteristics of the relationship with corporate donors directly affect the way this 
cue is interpreted by other set of stakeholders. In other terms, by carefully carving the nature of their 
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engagement with outside stakeholders and their portfolio of relationships, cultural organizations may 
succeed in protecting the esteem they receive from stakeholders within their field.  
In this study, we explore how sustaining relationships with corporate benefactors affect peers’ 
evaluation of cultural organizations. Empirically we rely on a mixed-method approach to study this 
theory in the context of Russian theaters and the peer recognition process through the most important 
award in that field: the Golden Mask. Given that this setting is the one driven by a dominant logic, it is 
ideal for studying the mapping of organizations with regards to institutional prescription (Lounsbury, 
2007). We employ a mixed-method approach as it allows us to create a theoretically robust account of 
“peer recognition”. Because this construct, imported from sociology (Lamont, 2012; Zuckerman, 2012; 
Cattani et al., 2014), is novel to management literature and cannot be explained and measured outside 
the context that gives it the form and content, a mixed approach method is most appropriate (Edmondson 
& McManus, 2007; DiStefano, King & Verona, 2015). The first empirical section is explorative in 
nature and aims at situating our theoretical arguments and setting up our hypotheses within our context. 
We argue that the salience of the tie with the negatively perceived set of stakeholders, captured by the 
number of donors of a particular theater, directly harms peer recognition. Corporate involvement with 
arts organizations may follow either an institution-centric type of partnership or a project-oriented 
collaboration akin to sponsorship; each bestows a different influence on the peers’ perception of the 
recipient’s level of adherence to traditionally held values and goals of the theater community. Beyond 
the type of partnership, theaters may put more or less effort into sustaining and prolonging their ties 
with particular donors. Longevity of the relationships with stakeholders signals a more or less profound 
and determinate degree of involvement with an outside stakeholder, and may aggravate or mitigate the 
negative bias their ties create in the eyes of peers. Finally, the industry of the donors plays a crucial role 
in showing how compromised the recipient is: when corporate donors belong to tainted categories such 
as the gas, oil and mining industries, the organization’s evaluation by peers will suffer further from this 
stakeholder relationship. Once formulated, we test these hypotheses on an exhaustive panel dataset that 
integrates two sets of variables: the detailed information on corporate partners and sponsors of each 
theater and the information on theater’s characteristics and nominations for the award during 2004-
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2011. To capture peer recognition, we look at the number of nominations that theaters obtain from 
participating in ‘The Golden Mask’ festival. We find multiple evidence to support our hypotheses after 
correcting for endogeneity and controlling for the heterogeneity of theaters’ offerings using random 
intercepts. 
We expand the institutional logic perspective by considering an organizational field as a space 
within which organizations can more or less distance themselves from the core values of the dominant 
logic. Our study shows that peers evaluate organizations on the basis of their distance from the dominant 
institutional prescription of their field, and this evaluation can be negatively impacted by the 
relationship the organization builds with stakeholders outside its social space. While previous research 
has explored how the change in the institutional environment affects stakeholder relationships, we know 
considerably less about the consequences of stakeholder relationships that run contrary to institutional 
prescriptions at the field level: excessive links with the corporate world are traditionally frowned upon 
in cultural fields (Bourdieu, 1993), and those links negatively affect the way organizations are perceived 
by their peers. In addition, we contribute to stakeholder theory by fleshing out the different dimensions 
of stakeholder relationships and how they affect the perception of those relationships. While the 
conceptualization of stakeholder salience has been central in stakeholder theory (Neville, Bell & 
Whitwell, 2011), presenting the organization as the nexus of a stakeholder network (Rowley, 1997; 
Frooman, 1999) gives a renewed importance to the management of simultaneous stakeholder 
expectations by field agents. In addition, we theorize the importance of distinguishing stakeholders 
within and outside of organizational field, whereas previous dichotomies mostly focused on the 
boundaries of the organization itself (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002; Freeman, 2010). Finally, our results 
contain important insights for cultural policy makers and put under scrutiny their willingness to transfer 
the economic responsibility for supporting artistic development and innovation to the private sector. 
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THE SIGNALING EFFECT OF STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIPS ON PEER 
RECOGNITION 
Although a relatively recent development, private business contributions to the fields of arts and culture 
represent a long historical tradition of corporate philanthropy and cross-sector collaboration (Googins 
& Rochlin, 2000; Brammer & Millington, 2005; Marquis et al., 2013). Cultural organizations such as 
museums, orchestras and theaters require both symbolic capital, derived from the legitimation processes 
of their field, and of economic capital, material resources which enable them to ensure discretion and 
autonomy in their actions (Anheier, et al. 1995). As a result, cultural organizations often find themselves 
torn between two imperatives: on the one hand, an expectation to produce aesthetically authentic output 
free from pragmatic financial considerations, as defined by the field in which they operate; and on the 
other hand, a necessity to build and manage their relationships with corporate donors (Townley, 2002; 
Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005). Actors in charge of preserving conventions within a cultural field – those 
who allocate symbolic capital - tend to frown upon the excessive involvement of corporate donors in 
their social space (Bourdieu, 1993), as corporate donors are often seen as pulling recipients away from 
the dominant logic of their field (Durand & Jourdan, 2012). However, within existing accounts of this 
predicament, there remains little exploration on how cultural organizations engaged in relationships 
with those extraneous stakeholders may be cast away by other members of the field and what they can 
do about it. 
Cultural Organizations’ Key Stakeholders within and outside Organizational Fields  
While early developments in stakeholder theory adopted a focus on dyadic relationship between 
the stakeholder and the focal organization (Margolis & Walsh, 2003), network approaches to 
stakeholder relationships have enriched our understanding of stakeholder management (Rowley, 1997). 
The primary premise of these confluent approaches is that the influences of different groups of 
stakeholders on the focal organizations are intertwined (Frooman, 1999). Similarly, institutional theory 
scholars acknowledge that the interests and demands of different stakeholders may clash (Oliver, 1991; 
Greenwood et al., 2011). The way organizations manage the relationships with one set of stakeholders 
directly affects the nature of other relationships (Rowley, 1997), especially the judgments and 
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evaluations other stakeholders pass on those organizations (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016). In turn, these 
evaluations are directly related to the ability of organizations to abide by the expectations of the judging 
stakeholders. The failure to meet these expectations may be attributed to the establishment of bonds 
with outside parties whose institutional stance can be at odds with the views and normative orientations 
of the judging stakeholders. While earlier literature at the intersection of institutional and stakeholder 
theories focused on how norms influenced stakeholder relationships (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; Doh 
& Guay, 2006), considerably less attention was given to examining the type of stakeholder relationships 
that might potentially constitute a form of deviance from a dominant institutional prescription. 
The social reality of organizations ostensibly reveals the existence of rivalry between different 
sets of stakeholders. Such tensions can arise due to the proximity each stakeholder has with the 
organization in terms of activity, objectives or values. In fact, understanding the influences of various 
stakeholders on the organization requires looking at the respective positions of these stakeholders in the 
social space of an organization (Rowley, 1997). One way to take into account this aspect is to make a 
distinction between stakeholders outside and inside the organizational field, as they control access to 
different forms of capital that might be more or less crucial to cultural organizations (Anheier, et al. 
1995). DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) concept of “organizational field” is based on Bourdieu's (1977; 
1993) notion of field: an organizational field relies on a common value system and unites organizations 
sharing in the same activity. More specifically, in the field of cultural production, key resources consist 
of symbolic capital provided by other actors within the field and economic capital provided by outsiders 
(Bourdieu, 1993; Thomson, 2014). On the one hand, the providers of symbolic capital are a key 
audience (Cattani et al., 2014) that hold the power to grant artistic recognition (Hsieh, 2010; Boerner & 
Jobst, 2011) and field-level legitimacy (Zuckerman, 1999). On the other hand, the considerations of 
economic survival push cultural organizations to build ties with benefactors outside of their field (Moir 
& Taffler, 2004). In cultural fields, this dual reliance on symbolic and economic capital is embodied by 
relationships with two major sets of stakeholders: audience members and corporate donors.  
In the presence of rivalry and power struggles amongst stakeholder groups, once an 
organization strengthens its ties with one group of stakeholders, another group can respond by 
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penalizing the focal organization (Frooman, 1999). Incumbents and entrenched stakeholders within an 
organizational field may perceive the growing power of external stakeholders over other field members 
as a threat to their position and control. In the field of cultural production, insiders try to fortify their 
positions by imposing judgments of what should be aesthetically appreciated (DiMaggio, 2011). Such 
norms include a dislike of corporate benefactors, as business sponsorship is seen as tainting the practice 
of aesthetic production maintained by incumbents (Bourdieu, 1993); this occurs despite an almost 
chronic condition of scarce and unstable funding in cultural fields. Symbolic capital providers within 
the field, charged with a mission of preserving existing conventions, tend to disapprove of economically 
driven entanglements because of their suspected influence over the nature of aesthetic activity (Anheier 
et al., 1995).	  For example, previous research on corporate philanthropy reveals that art museums in need 
of contributions appear acutely responsive to corporate preferences for representational art, as opposed 
to abstract art that caters to smaller segments of the population (Useem & Kutner, 1986). 
Peer Recognition in Cultural Fields  
In cultural fields, social judgments are only marginally a function of the quality of a cultural 
product: in an experiment, Salganik et al. (2006) created an artificial cultural market in which evaluation 
of products appeared to depend only negligibly on objective acumen. Zuckerman (2012) adds that social 
evaluation mostly relies on signals rather than on concrete cues. In particular, evaluation in cultural 
fields predominantly depends on connoisseurship because of the incommensurable nature of the goods 
at stake and the numerous social intermediaries whose guidance individuals take into account before 
consuming these goods (Lamont, 2012). The understanding of evaluative practices themselves 
considerably owes to Bourdieu‘s (1993) framework which theorizes the process of legitimacy 
attribution by gatekeepers (Schwartz, 1997). Cattani et al (2014) develop this idea by looking at peers 
as “agents of consecration” (ibid: 258). Due to the ambiguity in the judgment that can be formed about 
an aesthetic offering, popularity among peers is associated with positive quality judgments (Zuckerman, 
2012) and thus peer recognition is a key resource for cultural organizations (Hirsch, 1972). Peer 
evaluators are picked from the elite of the field, and thus have the authority to provide a legitimate 
judgment regarding the arts organizations operating in the field (Bourdieu, 1993).  
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Evaluative practices are aimed at capturing the ability of actors to comply with normative 
expectations (Lamont, 2012); such norms are developed at an institutional level. For example, Glynn 
& Lounsbury (2005) investigated how alterations in the evaluations of a symphony orchestra were 
triggered by a shift in the field’s institutional logic. In a similar way, Allen & Parsons (2006) studied 
the institutionalization of systemic evaluation in the field of baseball. These studies shed light on the 
institutional mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of social evaluation and bridge the gap between 
processes and practices (Lamont, 2012). One way to understand the mechanisms of professional 
evaluation is to look at organizational fields guided by an unequivocally present dominant logic 
(Lounsbury, 2007). The field of cultural production is a notorious example of such a context, where the 
evaluation of creative offerings follows the dictates “associated with the existing canon, genres and the 
dominant logic” (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005: 1036). In this setting, symbolic capital is a crucial resource 
rewarded to the actors who remain sensitive to the prevailing norms of social and aesthetic behavior in 
a given cultural field (Bourdieu, 1993). Peers consecrate actors who are the most similar to the majority 
of organizational actors within the field and who deviate the least from normative expectations (Lamont, 
2009; Cattani et al., 2014; Clemente & Roulet, 2015).  
 Cultural consecration depends on instruments that progressively acquire legitimacy (Allen & 
Parsons, 2006). Among the multitude of devices that support social structures in cultural fields, 
professional awards like ‘The Guild of Actors’ award, the ‘Grammy’ award or the ‘National Critics’ 
Book’ award epitomize the idea of peer recognition and offer symbolic capital to those who build upon 
orthodox rules of production (Kremp, 2010). By granting peer recognition, “incumbents work to defend 
and reproduce their views and impose consensus” (Cattani et al., 2014: 258). Therefore, within a field, 
peer recognition is a direct indicator of an actor’s legitimacy (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008) and 
embeddedness (Lamont, 2012). Building upon institutional logics, Glynn & Lounsbury (2005) show 
how peer recognition reflects adherence to the dominant logic of the cultural field. More specifically, 
peers are positively biased towards organizations that situate themselves at the core of the field (Cattani 
et al., 2014) as they have an interest in reproducing the existing aesthetic and social norms in order to 
maintain their dominant position. 
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The Signaling Effect of Relationships with Donors  
The opposition between the field of cultural production and the world of commerce, between 
artistic authenticity and economic success is the “generative principle of most of the judgments which 
[...] claim to establish the frontier between what is and what is not art” (Bourdieu, 1993: 82). This is the 
main reason why economic orientation (an inclination towards materialistic success) and symbolic 
capital (legitimacy within the field) are usually at odds with one another in cultural fields (Anheier, et 
al. 1995). Beyond the actual impact of the private donor on cultural organization’s behaviour, Bourdieu 
(1993) points out consequences for external perception of those who rely on donors. Cultural 
organizations with private donors risk losing peer recognition not because of any aesthetic reorientation, 
but because they may be symbolically penalized for violating the normative imperative of deprecating 
money or commercial endeavours, a norm that defines and distinguishes the field of cultural production 
from other domains of social activities. Thus, reliance on corporate donors may ultimately have a 
negative effect on the peers’ perception of the aesthetic authenticity of work produced with the 
involvement of private money. Glynn & Lounsbury (2005) offer an empirical examination of this 
predicament: they demonstrate how market-oriented symphony orchestras were consistently receiving 
less favorable reviews from professional critics. The more corporate partners a cultural organization 
has, the more it is seen as having to compromise and abide by the commercial codes of an even larger 
pool of extraneous stakeholders. In other words, the necessity of cultural organizations to establish 
relationships with corporate donors to maintain discretion over their cultural production may 
paradoxically jeopardize the professional judgment of their work. 
  Stakeholders heavily rely on signals to formulate evaluation (Gomulya & Mishina, 
Forthcoming) and peer recognition is no exception. Reliance on signals is necessary when some 
attributes are unobservable (Spence, 1973). This is particularly the case of cultural fileds in which there 
is no objective measure of performance (Lamont, 2012: Zuckerman, 2012). Organizations thus need to 
communicate their worth to their audience (Gomulya & Mishina, 2016), and one way to do that is to 
signal their proximity to the most relevant institutional logic (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014). An 
organization signaling its respect for convention and canons of the field helps other actors evaluate its 
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proximity to the dominant logic (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005). Organizations that are “more strongly 
associated with the dominant canons” of their field are more likely to receive peer recognition (Cattani 
et al., 2014: 262). While most of the signaling literature focuses on how organizations associate 
themselves with specific third parties to receive a more positive evaluation (Reuer, Tong & Wu, 2012), 
we argue that some association with third parties can have an opposite effect and result in a negative 
evaluation.  
According to signaling theory, peers as the “receivers” would focus on what they think is 
correlated with quality (Sanders & Boivie, 2004) when they evaluate cultural organizations’ offerings. 
Excessive ties with corporate donors - “extraneous” stakeholders because of their commercial 
orientation (Schwartz, 1997) – are directly interpreted as a violation of peers’ expectations. The 
perceived violation of stakeholder expectations triggers negative stakeholder evaluation (Gomulya & 
Mishina, 2016). The active pursuit of corporate benefaction by cultural organizations violates the norms 
of their field and distances them from its dominant logic. While signaling is often considered an active 
organizational strategy (Connelly et al., 2011), it can also occur passively: bonds with donors inherently 
come with the negative signaling effect. Despite this signal being unwanted by the signaling 
organization, a number of strategies can still be put in place to manipulate the information portrayed in 
that signal, which can mitigate negative organizational outcomes (Hochwarter, et al 2007). 
Mitigating the Negative Signal of being associated with Extraneous Stakeholders 
Considering the negative signal associated with the relationship with extraneous stakeholders, 
altering this relationship can help result in less detrimental information being conveyed to peers. Under 
the rationale of strategic agility, organizations actively manage their stakeholder relationships (Oliver, 
1991; Rowley, 1997). Organizations can become “actors in their own destinies” (Durand & Jourdan, 
2012: 1299) by being aware of the multiple institutional pressures and balancing them. The modalities 
of collaboration with corporate donors can be used to minimize the organization’s relationship with this 
donor in the eyes of other key stakeholders. Various strategies can be employed by cultural 
organizations to show that they are not compromised by their relationship with extraneous stakeholders 
and that they are protecting their artistic autonomy and organizational discretion. 
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What characteristics of the relationship with corporate donors can be adjusted to limit the 
adverse nature of the signal sent to peers? Stakeholder relationships differ in many aspects (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995) and organizations have a degree of discretion in the way they manage and structure 
inter-organizational relationships (Freeman, 2010). Breadth and depth are often used in the management 
literature to capture magnitude (e.g. Jourdan & Kivleniece, Forthcoming) and the nature of bonds with 
external sets of actors (Oliver & Horzinger, 2008). In a similar way, we consider here the breadth, depth 
and valence of the stakeholder relationship as moderation mechanisms for the signaling process 
associated with the negatively perceived ties. First, an organization can decide to which extent the 
stakeholder is involved in its decision making and functioning: the influence of the stakeholder can 
pervade a larger share of the organization’s activity (Frooman, 1999). This is what we call “the breadth 
of the relationship”: it represents the scope of activities in which the donor can be involved. Second, 
while the stakeholder can be involved in a broader scope of activities (breadth), it can also have more 
influence in each of the activities with which it is associated. Granovetter (1973: 1361) has 
acknowledged that a key determinant of the strength of an inter-organizational tie is intimacy and its 
“mutual[ly] confiding” nature. There can indeed be more or less proximity between an organization and 
its stakeholder (Driscoll & Starik, 2004). This is the depth of the relationship: it captures how much the 
organization is accustomed to the stakeholder’s influence. Finally, within the domain of cultural 
organizations in which commercial and artistic orientations are antagonized (Bourdieu, 1993), there can 
be a varying degree of hostility towards extraneous stakeholders. We define it as valence of the 
relationship or the degree of taint of the relationship in the eyes of another key stakeholder group. 
Hereafter we discuss how these different dimensions can be captured in the context of corporate 
benefaction in cultural fields. 
What captures the pervasiveness of a stakeholder relationship or the extent to which the 
stakeholder is involved in organizational life? The mode of corporate support that arts organizations 
choose to accept is one way to set up the boundaries of the relationships with corporate supporters. 
Previous research documents the existence of two types of corporate involvement with arts 
organizations: project-centric (also called “sponsorship”) and institution-centric (also referred to as 
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“philanthropy”) (Bourdieu, 1993; Bargenda, 2004). Project-centric collaboration implies that arts 
organizations seek to acquire corporate sponsorship for concrete creative projects under strictly defined 
agreements which outline specific contractual obligations of each party. It is in line with the broader 
definition of organizational sponsorship which is based on the idea of providing organizations with 
supplemental resources which will increase survival rate (Amezcua et al., 2013). In the context of 
corporate donation in the field of cultural production, the benefits for both parties are more limited in 
scope. It also curtails the pervasiveness of the relationship with the donor. Building up project-centric 
partnerships is a “structural differentiation” (Greenwood et al. 2011) in the sense that only a sub-unit 
of the organization is associated with the outsider, and this sub-unit carries out “compartmentalized” 
interactions (Anand, Gardner & Morris, 2007). This way, cultural organizations can reveal that merely 
a part of their activity can be disavowed for its market orientation (Bourdieu, 1993) while the essence 
of organizational ethos is still faithful to the ideal of providing artistically unrestrained cultural output. 
Consequently, we would expect this type of relationship with a corporate donor to mitigate the negative 
signal sent to the peers: the distancing from the core values of the field implied in the relationship with 
extraneous stakeholders is attenuated because the bond is only limited to a controlled portion of the 
organizational activity. By contrast, because institution-centric relationships are binding and pervasive 
(Glynn, 2000), they can be seen as a full embrace of the outsider, which can be seen as coming at a 
price of aesthetic authenticity and professional integrity. 
The longevity of the relationship with an extraneous stakeholder, because it determines the 
durability of implication and the intimacy built up between the stakeholder and the organization, can 
capture the depth of the relationship. Mutual commitment between the organization and its stakeholders 
increases with time (Weiss & Kurland, 1997), with longer relationships becoming more informal and 
personal (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Expectedly, a stakeholder with a longer history of relations with 
the organization signals a higher degree of proximity and intimacy (Korschun, 2015), ultimately 
aggravating the negative signal triggered by the ties with extraneous stakeholders. 
While ties with corporate donors signal distance from the dominant logic of the cultural field, 
we argue that there is a variance in the negative perception of those donors. Some characteristics of the 
donors aggregate at the relationship level, making the relationship with the extraneous stakeholder 
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group more or less adversely perceived. This encapsulates the negative valence associated with the 
stakeholder relationship, which also moderates the negative bias against cultural organizations 
connected to corporate donors. Considering the variance in the perception of stigmatized stakeholder 
groups (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Piazza & Perretti, 2015), we argue that there are variations in the way 
extraneous stakeholders are perceived by stakeholders within the field. Bourdieu (1993) draws 
qualitative distinctions between commercially oriented actors and acknowledges the multiplicity of 
their objectives. In a similar vein, some corporate donors will appear as more tainted in the eyes of 
peers. Looking at the industry membership of benefactors thus enables us to distinguish more or less 
tainted categories of corporate donors (Galvin et al., 2004). Consequently, the split in the industry 
membership of donors will provide a variance in the perception of the ties cultural organizations form 
with them as a group of stakeholders.  
To explore how ties with adversely perceived stakeholders outside the field negatively bias peer 
recognition of an organization’s proximity to a dominant logic, and how this effect can be mitigated by 
shaping the breadth, depth and valence of the stakeholder relationship, we empirically focus on a 
particular field of cultural production: music and drama theaters. In this setting, we face differentiated 
breadth of relationships with corporate donors (project vs institution centric), depth (longevity of the 
relationship with a donor) and valence (donor’s industry). In the next section, we offer an in-depth 
qualitative exploration of our setting and a contextualization of our hypotheses. This mixed method 
approach is justified by the mixing of existing framework with more nascent concepts and theoretical 
ideas (Edmondson & McManus. 2007).  
EXPLORATORY QUALITATIVE STUDY: THE BIASES OF PEER RECOGNITION IN 
THE RUSSIAN THEATER INDUSTRY 
Our qualitative exploration has several objectives. Firstly, we intend to explain our choice of studying 
theatrical production in the Russian Federation and its positioning in a larger institutional environment. 
We highlight this setting as ideal for the exploration of the mechanisms of peer recognition and how 
social evaluations are affected by the relationship with stakeholders outside the field. Secondly, this 
introductory qualitative section provides crucial elements of context such as the understanding of the 
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dominant logic of the field and how it informs the internal legitimation of field actors. We also reveal 
the processes through which corporate benefaction can be perceived as a threat to authenticity in the 
field of cultural production. Finally, we use the insights to better identify and define appropriate 
constructs and measurements for the quantitative part of the study. In the following, we combine 
empirical evidence inductively to formulate hypotheses regarding the effect of extraneous stakeholder 
relationships on peer recognition. 
The Theater Industry in Russia as a Setting to Understand the Mechanisms of Peer Recognition 
We selected an industry with a number of distinctive figures to explore the biases affecting peer 
recognition. A distinguishing feature of the field of cultural production is its close relation to a national 
cultural identity that guides, sanctions, and appraises creative efforts of field actors (Boerner & Jobst, 
2011; Voss et al., 2008). Some creative industries may have international audiences, but the survival 
and development of their constitutive professional organizations – e.g. museums (Alexander, 1996), 
theaters (Voss & Voss, 2000), and philharmonic orchestras (Durand & Kremp, 2015) – remain highly 
dependent on and constrained by national socio-political and economic arrangements. To conduct our 
research, we needed a creative industry with many comparable actors, with well-established, salient and 
sedimentary professional norms and with a high degree of exposure to a national cultural policy. The 
theater industry met all the criteria. The last step was to find a country with a strong and well-developed 
theater industry which had recently gone through a considerable change in its national cultural policy 
resulting in a direct impact on theaters. The Russian Federation proved to be an ideal example for our 
purposes. 
Theater has always occupied an exceptionally high position in the political and social life of 
Russian citizens (Leach & Borovsky, 2008). In 2004 there were around 715 theaters, including 
children’s theaters in Russia; according to some current estimates, this number is now approaching 800. 
A very large majority of theaters in Russia are characterized by state control, in which actors and 
management are civil servants. However, they still retain a high degree of self-governance in issues 
such as funding, financial management and artistic repertoire. Internationally, Russian theatrical 
tradition has exerted a tremendous influence on contemporary world theater practice in the twentieth 
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century, with contributions ranging from mainstream acting – where the influence of Konstantin 
Stanislavsky and Vsevolod Meyerhold is highly regarded worldwide – to twentieth-century ballet – 
largely the creation of Russian dancers and choreographers such as Piotr Chaikovsky and Sergei 
Diagilev (Leach & Borovsky, 2008). In Russia, major theater practitioners are widely known and 
admired, their ideas are pored over and discussed, and their productions are often the subject of popular 
debates in vast numbers of newspapers, magazine articles, and social media.  
Methodology for the Exploratory Qualitative Study 
To better understand the professional logic of the chosen industry and particularly “its rules of 
consecration” (Bourdieu, 1993), we engaged in a qualitative study of Russian theater professionals and 
organizations. Our qualitative assessment is based on three main data sources, which are summarized 
in Table 1. First, through direct observation as cultural consumers we familiarized ourselves with the 
industry, its historical development, and its players, industry-related publications (including books on 
the history of Russian theater), critical essays on contemporary Russian theater, articles published in 
the specialized and popular national press, and official press-releases of the Ministry of Culture of 
Russian Federation. We conducted seven in-depth semi-structured interviews with theater professionals 
willing to talk to us under conditions of anonymity, supplemented with a number of follow-up 
conversations at different stages of the research process. Given the difficulty in obtaining primary 
source data, we also relied on rich archival data and publicly available sources that publish opinions of 
leading field actors such as artistic theater directors, actors, choreographers, independent theater critics 
and festival directors on the state of the field. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
------------------------------------ 
The Golden Mask Nomination 
With the demise of communism in the 1990s, Russian theaters found themselves largely unprepared for 
economic and political liberalization. New social realities no longer required the theater “to function 
simultaneously as a wise teacher and the allegorical voice of thoughts, aspirations and feelings 
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forbidden by the political regime.” (Leach & Borovsky, 2008:10) and the pressure for economic 
survival often came at odds with what many considered to be the core values of the field. Despite the 
fact that one quarter of the adult Russian population claims to go to the theater at least four times a year 
(the Russian language even has a designated term for this  – “театрал” -teatral”)1, some professionals 
in the field and our informants felt that the former role of the Russian theater in its ceaseless effort to 
enlighten and cultivate its audience gave way to conformity and popular taste that mostly seeks 
entertainment and “lavish spectacle”. In an attempt to preserve the original tradition of Russian theater 
and safeguard its core values, starting from the mid-90s, prominent field actors began to create different 
institutions of professional recognition that in most cases took the form of national annual festivals. The 
largest and most prestigious festival of Russian theater professionals is the Golden Mask festival. 
Keeping alive the field’s spirit of political dissent, the festival often found itself in the midst of 
controversy by nominating or rewarding productions that provoked and openly criticized the authorities. 
These antagonistic relationships have grown stronger in recent years when nationalistic rhetoric started 
dominating the Russian political scene. In his response to the recent accusations made by the Ministry 
of Culture for “not respecting the popular demand for more patriotic theater”, the General Director of 
the Festival, Gennadiy Taratorkin said the following: 
“I think they accuse us, not understanding what we stand for. From the dawn of its foundation 
in 1993 by Theater Union of the Russian Federation, the Festival has been representing a purely 
professional contest: the evaluation of theater professionals by their peers. The Golden Mask 
documents in the most objective and impartial way the reality of this country and its people. Theater 
critically examines and reflects on all aspects of social and political life, sometimes even being able to 
foresee and anticipate our upcoming future”2  
In an open letter to the Minister of Culture earlier this year the organizers highlighted the 
guiding ideals of the festival:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Market of theater performances in Russian Federation 2004-2010: review and forecast” based on the data 
from Russian Public Opinion Research Center   
2	  http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2733942	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“The Golden Mask was created and has been developing as an independent professional award 
assigned for the service to the theatrical art or what we call “an award from peers to peers”3.  
The Golden Mask nomination is clearly a marker of field-level legitimacy which is embodied 
in Bourdieu’s (1993) symbolic capital and more specifically in the concept of peer recognition 
developed by Cattani, et al. (2014). The Golden Mask favors theaters that embrace the tradition of 
Russian theater and combine an open critical stance on the country’s social reality and resistance to the 
commodification of cultural production. The nomination is a form of peer recognition that contributes 
to the reproduction of existing canons and the reinforcement of the dominant logic of the field. 
How did Societal Change Reinforce the Dominant Logic of the Russian Theater Field? 
Despite rapid market liberalization and privatization in the 1990s, the Russian government has 
sought ways to retain control over the extensive structure of national theaters that constitute an 
important part of national identity and cultural legitimation of Russia in the West (Leach & Borovsky, 
2008). Facing a gradual drop in popular demand for theatrical performances in the early 2000s, 
especially in provincial areas, and struggling with a severe economic crisis, but still being reluctant to 
privatize or close state owned theaters, the Russian authorities decided to turn to a communitarian model 
of arts support and place theaters in the domain of corporation social action. 
As a result of a new turn in the national cultural policy, over the last ten years the Russian 
government has been steadily decreasing funding for cultural production in order to promote a transition 
towards a diversified model of financing, supporting and promoting culture4. The introduction of the 
new legal form of “autonomous organization” in 2003 also targeted the cultural sector supporting its 
“destatization” and encouraging theaters to rely on a broader set of stakeholders. The new arrangement 
limits the responsibilities of the state and forces theaters to build new ties. In 2003 the Russian 
government introduced legislation on public-private sponsorship that supported the establishment of 
the boards of trustees and societies. In 2004 the Russian President fostered a public discussion on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 http://www.interfax.ru/culture/443546 
4 Compendium Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, Council of Europe official report, 2011 
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social responsibility of business. All these conjoint measures have resulted in the growing role of 
corporate support for culture and more active engagement of arts organizations in the search of 
collaboration opportunities with the private sector. Consequently, most Russian theaters found 
themselves in the situation, where on the one hand, they were encouraged to establish ties with 
economic actors, but on the other hand, they were still expected to maintain their authenticity and 
professional standards of “great theatrical tradition”. Many professionals felt that the new arrangements 
would be humiliating and detrimental to the artistic integrity of the field as they would put theaters in 
the position of “asking for alms” (as pointed out in Teatral, leading journal of the industry, in an article 
from 2012 entitled “With a stretched out hand”) and incentivize them to make an improper use of their 
cultural capital. A theater producer recalled a story when a well-known artistic director of a famous 
Moscow theater decided to look for corporate benefactors: 
“When you think about it, who would say “no” to such a figure as Alexander Kalyagin5? He 
started meeting all potential donors, but it ended in nothing. Each one of them was willing to help but 
only in exchange for some preferential treatment. To be clear – we are not talking about the tickets in 
the first row. The wealthiest businessman was the most outspoken. He demanded help in meeting one 
of top government officials. The theater decided to move ahead with the production without any private 
donors.”    
Several artistic directors we interviewed confess that they have been put in the situation where 
managing the relationship with donors takes priority over artistic endeavors. Yury Lyubimov, the 
legendary artistic director of Taganka theater, publicly resigned from his position in 2012 stating that 
“the state has turned me into a gold digger who is pushed to constantly look for money and do favors”.  
The Perception of Corporate Benefactors in the Theater Industry 
Despite active and occasionally coercive promotion of corporate support of arts institutions, 
until 2015 there were no laws in Russia regulating or incentivizing philanthropic activities in the cultural 
sphere. Nevertheless, in the last 15 years a growing number of firms have been involved in the economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Alexander Kalyagin is one of the most popular and recognizable Russian film and theater actor. 
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support of cultural organizations, theaters in particular. Several reasons explain these semi-
institutionalized practices of philanthropy. On the one hand, corporations employ philanthropy as a part 
of their non-market strategy to gain legitimacy in post-Soviet Russia. In the institutional context that 
combines fierce economic rivalry and strong government centralization, firms tend to favor symbolic 
actions (Roulet & Touboul, 2015). Expectedly, Russian firms try to link their corporate brand names 
with the brand names of big federal theaters which hold great symbolic importance. Some of our 
informants reveal that companies operating in certain regions make contributions to local cultural 
organizations as a way to access or engage with local political elites. This is especially true for 
companies in the mining and extraction sector, as these industries can be extremely lucrative, but require 
good relations with local regulating bodies. Sometimes the initiative for such engagement comes from 
the local authorities themselves: local government officials offer their help to firms on the condition 
that they support theaters in the region. 
Our informants converge to suggest there is very limited variance in the amount of money given 
by donors due to the willingness of both to avoid any extra attention of the state control organs. Our 
informants also affirm that there is limited competition among donors because donations to theaters do 
not rank high on the list of preferred CSR projects.6 A multiplicity of donors hence clearly signifies a 
larger pool of resources rather than a fragmentation of the pool of resource providers.  
As stressed by Valery Yakov, the chief editor of “Teatral’’, ties with sponsors are visible to 
other actors in the field, and signal involvement of a group of stakeholder that is extraneous to the field. 
In 2012 he wrote: 
“For us, the organizers of theater award ceremonies, a line with the name of a general sponsor 
on theater’s poster says a lot of things – about its projects, the management of the theater and the talent 
of the cast. But what it exposes most explicitly is the taste of the sponsor.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  To empirically validate this assumption, we ran an ANOVA on 86 % (theaters in St Petersburg & Moscow) of 
our sub-sample of theaters with donors to check whether there was a significant difference in the productive 
output of theaters with the same number of donors (in terms of new premieres and number of performances). 
Theaters with the same number of donors have a similar productive output (keeping other factors constant), 
which suggests little variance in the amount of resources provided by individual donors. 
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 The personal connections with the private sector are rare and some theaters may prefer to 
“solicit” corporate support in an indirect way. In an environment almost entirely controlled by the state, 
public theaters may use their social capital (ties with government officials) to push for donations from 
private firms. Theaters with corporate ties are thus seen as not only making a pact with an extraneous 
stakeholder with negatively perceived commercial orientation, but also more generally as 
compromising the principles of their field. As explained by a theater director in one of our interviews: 
“Businesses have very few incentives for voluntary acts of charity. They usually do it after “a 
ring”. A high-level state official gives a call and says: “You have to help this theater”. And then 
everything starts moving. It is a reptile type of sponsorship.” 
In her interview, Milena Avimskaya, the artistic director of the theater “OnTeart”, points out at 
the imperishable antagonisms of market pragmatism and core values of the field that coincides with 
Bourdieu’s analysis of the field’s distinctiveness: 
“A theater director and a businessman speak two different languages. A businessman is 
primarily interested in a theater that is a modern brand. Theater is an art form that feeds itself on past 
and tradition. When everything started, I sent out 76 letters to big companies who I thought would be 
willing to help us because they prioritized cultural support in their CSR [corporate social 
responsibility] programs. We received one reply asking to provide the details of the project. I was also 
not surprised to learn that many companies where the state is one of the shareholders just follow a 
command from the top to support ideologically appropriate productions and organizations.”  
Unsurprisingly, many of our respondents recoiled over what they perceived as utilitarian manipulation 
of cultural legacy. Actors within the field felt that corporate donations had pushed theaters to 
compromise their artistic independence. According to Michail Uliyanov, a renowned actor and artistic 
director of Vakhtangov theater in Moscow,  
“If before theater was strangled by the ideology of communism, nowadays it is strangled by the 
ideology of money. We are caught in the trap: on the one hand, we are told we can produce whatever 
we want if it does not offend the law, but on the other hand, we find ourselves at the mercy of money 
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holders willing or unwilling to help us. And this situation is more hopeless. Will we face the situation 
when the lack of funding will push us to do mediocre work and indulge bad taste?”  
This perception of the influence of corporate donors inevitably affects the way actors perceive 
each other within the field. The information regarding the number of corporate donors is public and 
visible for the peers (it is displayed on theatre’s official website and in social media), but it never reveals 
the actual magnitude of corporate monetary benefaction. 
In the specific context of the Russian theater industry, there are several reasons why – despite 
being crucially needed – corporate donors are negatively perceived. Firstly, theaters relying on 
corporate philanthropy are seen as being mainly driven by economic rationale rather than their cultural 
and aesthetic mission. As predicted by Bourdieu (1993), relying on external material resources is seen 
as embracing a “commercial” approach, and thus is at odds with the vocation of theaters. This approach 
is seen as pushing theaters away from established values by peers (Kremp, 2010). Secondly, having 
corporate donors suggests the existence of commercialization of the cultural organizations’ ties with 
government officials and the increasing commodification of the arts in a post-communist Russia. This 
impression reinforces the belief that corporate donors are alien to the field, and representative of a 
utilitarian vision of cultural production (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005). Thus, we hypothesize that the 
salience of the relationship with corporate donors – i.e. the number of corporate donors – will negatively 
affect the judgment of the Golden Mask jury, everything else being equal. 
Hypothesis 1: The number of corporate donors a theatre relies on (the salience of 
the ties with the extraneous stakeholder group) will decrease its odds of obtaining peers’ 
recognition 
Playing with the Characteristics of the Relationship as a Mitigation Strategy 
All private donations to theaters fall under either the legal category of “sponsorship agreement” (what 
we defined as project-centric support) or the category of “donation agreement” (institution-centric 
support). Donation agreement neither imposes any obligations on a beneficiary nor links a benefactor 
to a specific project of a supported institution. Sponsorship agreements with cultural institutions allow 
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companies, legally restrained in their choice of traditional advertising channels such as radio and TV, 
to reach out to their target audiences. Donation agreements ,on the other hand, permit companies to 
spend up to 25% of their EBIT on charitable contributions to the institutions of their choice7. Our 
informants suggest that in the process of seeking and selecting corporate donors, theaters also have the 
opportunity to decide on the mode of corporate support, its format and boundaries. While these external 
relationships are crucial, theater directors and executives are also clearly aware of the fact that such ties 
may be negatively perceived by their peers. 
Theaters have the opportunity to select a mode of corporate support that constrains the influence 
exerted by donors over the organization. They can approach their potential donors with either specific 
projects they would like to be funded or with a general proposition of overall institutional support for a 
certain period of time. An initial proposition to a potential donor and its format always come from a 
theater. Its strategic discretion consists in choosing “what to sell” – an original project with a celebrity 
cast or an entire institution with its past and present cultural allure.  Project-centric proposition enables 
theaters to collaborate with donors under a defined agreement and within the context of a clearly 
identified project. The name of a corporate donor is then only associated with the specific project at 
stake. Such circumscription of the donor’s influence signals to peers the ability and willingness to 
preserve professional integrity. By contrast, the benefits of institution-centric collaboration can be 
spread over different productions (Henderson, 2003) but also extend to various support functions on 
which theaters rely (Glynn, 2000). Corporate involvement is integrated into a range of activities and the 
influence of corporate partners is seen as more pervasive. This mode of support is perceived as more 
compromising and binding, thus accentuating the negative effect on peer recognition. Thus the choice 
between institution- and project-centric collaboration captures the breadth of the relationship with 
corporate donors: the broader is the relationship, the more negatively it is perceived by peers. 
Hypothesis 2: Institution rather than project centric-collaboration with corporate 
donors (a more extensive breadth of the relationship with the extraneous stakeholder 
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  Donations to cultural organizations cannot exceed 2% of EBIT	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group) will accentuate the negative signaling effect of relationships with corporate 
benefactors on peer recognition.  
The longevity of ties with a corporate donor is public information that conveys the depth of the 
relationship: the longer the same corporate donor is involved with the theater, the more profound and 
intimate is their influence on theater’s decisions. Leonid Osharin, the director of Mayakovsky theater 
in Moscow, explained in one of the interviews that sustaining relations comes at a price as many 
sponsors often use the longevity of their involvement as a mandate to influence theater’s policies in 
multiple domains8, especially when finding another benefactor is extremely difficult: 
“A sponsor may say: I want to increase salaries for particular actors – and all his money is 
used for a few pay checks. Then he may decide to support just one new premier or re-decorate the 
building. Such “target-oriented” engagement develops over time [...] and we have to adjust.”   
  From the peers’ perspective, durable relationships with the same donor generate more 
sensitivity to its demands. Peers ultimately fear that longer relationships lead to a sponsor’s imposition 
of choices and preferences regardless of the will of theater’s director and cast. This is especially relevant 
in the case of experimental theaters that often look for iconoclastic interpretations of classical plays and 
the work of nationally cherished authors.  
The commitment to a relationship with a donor as it grows over time “not only transforms an 
economic exchange into a socially embedded relationship, but also forecloses opportunities of 
cultivating alternative personal relationships” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: 107). The longevity of a tie 
with a corporate donor reflects the depth of the relationship, as in the eyes of peers, this visible 
information captures the extent to which recipients are accustomed to the donor’s claims.  
Hypothesis 3: The longevity of involvement with the same corporate donor (the 
depth of the relationship with the extraneous stakeholder group) will accentuate the 
negative signaling effect of relationships with corporate benefactors on peer recognition. 
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Finally, how do some relationships with donors carry more negative valence? In our context, we 
argue that the valence of extraneous stakeholder relationships is associated with the variance in the 
perception of corporate donors. More negatively perceived donors make the stakeholder relationship 
between donors as a group and theaters carry a more adverse valence. To contextualize our theoretical 
proposition, we explore which industries are considered as most at odds with the dominant logic of the 
industry and thus signal the highest level of compromise.  
In 2008 and 2009 the group of renowned Russian artists and public intellectuals organized a 
collective protest against Gazprom and its plans to construct the skyscraper “Gazprom Tower” in the 
historical center of Saint Petersburg, considered by many to be the cultural capital of the Russian 
Federation.  More than 50 theater professionals wrote an open letter to the Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev expressing their disdain over the corruptive practices of mining and extraction industries 
(tightly controlled by the state) and of Gazprom being the most representative of them: 
“The allocation of 60 billion RUB obtained from the sales of our commonly shared natural 
resources in the situation of economic crisis and the failure of the state to sustain decent living 
conditions of its people is immoral. Moreover, such actions are not only immoral and destructive, they 
are also illegal. By succumbing to the commercial interests of Gazprom and similar corporations, the 
authorities create a dangerous precedent of neglecting and surpassing legally set restrictions on what 
companies can do in publicly protected cultural space. We consider it to be a clear case of legal nihilism 
and corruption.”9 
Mining and extraction companies in Russia consistently find themselves involved in notorious 
corruption scandals which include bribery, expropriation and abuse of minority shareholders, illicit 
constructions, violation of safety and ecological standards. Many of these malpractices have been 
documented and made public by a minority shareholder rights activist William Browder10, the founder 
of “Hermitage Capital” investment fund and the lobbyist for the famous “Magnitsky Act” passed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 http://www.gazeta.spb.ru/198278-0/ 
10 https://snob.ru/magazine/entry/44795 
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by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.11 Considering this wide scope of qualitative evidence 
of theatre professionals’ sensitivity towards behavior and reputation of the companies coming from 
particular industries12, we predict that  
Hypothesis 4: The number of corporate donors from tainted industries such as 
mining and extraction (the adverse valence of the relationship with the extraneous 
stakeholder group) accentuates the negative signaling effect of relationships with 
corporate benefactors on peer recognition. 
QUANTITATIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Methods and Measures 
Sample and Data: To test our hypotheses we have constructed a panel dataset for theaters, which 
represents almost 80% of the whole population of drama and music Russian theaters, spread over a 
period from 2004 to 2011. The panel incorporates the set of variables with the details of corporate 
support for each theater from 2004 to 2011: the number of corporate donors, national origin, the type 
of involvement (project-centric and institution-centric), the duration of support, their industry type and 
the presence of a board of trustees. The data collection method included the usage of the official 
database of Russian theaters provided by the Ministry of Culture, the aggregation of information from 
official theater websites on which they are obliged by law to provide the information relating to their 
corporate partners, the members of the board and the type of support they receive. As highlighted in the 
qualitative exploration, the amount of resources provided by each corporate donor is neither accessible 
nor visible to peers, and both insights from the field study and the analysis of variance in the productive 
output (see footnote 7) suggest there is little variance between the donations made by the different 
donors. To ensure chronological consistency we looked for the information on the duration and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-magnitsky-case	  
12	  More than 75 classical musicians from the UK published an open letter in 2015 asking the Royal Opera House to cut its 
ties with British Petroleum and cease the partnership that started in 1988 
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2015/jul/02/cut-ties-with-bp-composers-and-music-researchers-tell-royal-opera-house 
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beginning of support for each specific corporate partner by studying their annual CSR reports, or in the 
case of their absence – contacting a theater directly and asking for additional information.  
The total population of Russian theaters includes 711 organizations across 71 regions. Most 
theaters are concentrated in six major cities: Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Samara, Ekaterinburg, 
Chelyabinsk and Perm. We have excluded the children theaters (213 in total) from our sample as it is 
reasonable to conclude that they belong to a distinct organizational field and that their corporate support 
relies on a different set of criteria than the ones discussed in this paper. After also excluding 
organizations with ambiguous or missing information that could not be verified, we ended up with 449 
theaters and 3,573 theater-year observations13. We have chosen 2004 as the starting point for the panel 
construction to gauge the effect of official state endorsement and promotion of corporate social action 
initiated in 2003. Additionally, the Ministry of Culture started systematizing and providing the 
information on arts organizations, their status and rules of funding through its press-releases and later 
through its website only in late 2003.  
We have merged this database with another set of variables on peer recognition of theaters from 
2004 to 2011 that includes an acknowledgement of professional nomination in the Golden Mask 
festival, the number of obtained nominations, categories of nominations and the number of received 
awards. Our Table 2 summarizes the construction of our variables. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
------------------------------------ 
Dependent Variable: Consistent with previous research on creative industries, we measure “peer 
recognition” in two ways: as a count of annual nominations that an arts organization obtains in the most 
prestigious contest of the cultural area it represents (Kremp, 2010; Cattani et al., 2014) and as a binary 
outcome – a probability of getting a nomination. The binary operationalization signals the willingness 
of the peers to consider a theater as a recipient of symbolic capital. The number of nominations indicates 
the extent of theater’s recognition by the peers, or in other words – the amount of symbolic capital they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The difference with the number of observations reported in the regression is due to the lagging of independent variables. 
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are willing to grant. As demonstrated in the qualitative stage of the study, in Russia, the most renowned 
contest in the area of drama and music theater arts is the National Theater Award, also known as the 
Golden Mask.  
           The main festival program includes productions selected by two Boards of experts (one for 
drama and one for musical theater) as nominations for the Golden Mask Award. During the Festival the 
two juries composed of actors, directors, conductors, choreographers and theater make decisions about 
the winners of the Golden Mask Award.  The jury changes every year and the jury members are not 
paid for their services. The Festival of performances, nominated for the Golden Mask Award, is a major 
forum, representing a full and objective picture of Russian theatrical life to professionals and public at 
large. As outlined in our qualitative section, the Golden Mask award is perceived as a judgment 
formulated by peers although some of the jury members might be critics. Critics in the field of theaters 
are usually former theater professionals. An important aspect of nomination process is that each jury 
member votes anonymously although the deliberations over what theaters are worthy of recognition are 
open.   
Independent variables and moderators: Our variable of interest for Hypothesis 1 is defined as the 
number of corporate donors to measure the salience of the relationships with negatively perceived 
stakeholders outside the field. Salience is operationalized as the number of corporate donors that a 
theater has in a given year, considering that this is the most noticeable feature of the ties with this group 
of stakeholders. 
We rely on a two-stage estimation procedure (because of endogeneity concerns explained 
below), which uses the variable of regional economic development (the percentage of profitable 
enterprises) and the variable of theaters’ density in a region as two instruments to predict the number 
of corporate donors in the first estimation step. 
To test our moderation hypotheses, we restrict the sample to the theaters that receive donorship 
and apply a two-stage estimation procedure following Wooldridge (2010). For Hypothesis 2 we 
construct an independent dichotomous variable to capture the breadth of the stakeholder relationship 
manifested in a type of pursued collaboration: project-centric collaboration (depicted as 0) and 
institution-centric collaboration (depicted as 1). Theaters strategically build their relationships with the 
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corporate sector and therefore make discrete choices over the type of collaboration they seek to pursue. 
Most theaters take “either or” type of decisions when choosing a pattern of collaboration to save on 
possible transaction and legal costs they may incur in case of adopting a hybrid strategy. To test how 
the type of involvement (breadth of the relationship) moderates the relations between salience of the 
ties with corporate donors and peer recognition we interact our dichotomous variable with the number 
of donors a theater has in a given year.  
To test the moderation effect of the depth of involvement with the outside stakeholders, we look 
at the longest tie with a corporate donor in theater’s portfolio. Most durable corporate donors usually 
obtain the status of “general partners” or “general donors”, and their relationship with a theater is 
publicized more persistently creating lasting associations in public and among the peers. Therefore, we 
believe that this operationalization accurately captures the depth aspect of theater’s involvement with 
the corporate world. Finally, to test our moderation hypothesis of valence, we note the industry 
memberships of the donors and indicate the number of donors a theater had from mining and extraction 
(predominantly oil and gas) industries in a given period. This operationalization facilitates further visual 
depiction and interpretation of the results. We interact this count variable with the number of corporate 
donors. 
Control variables: We use an exhaustive list of theaters’ characteristics as control variables. It includes 
the theater’s age (in years), size (number of seats), category (music or drama), celebrity status of artistic 
cast (obtainment of major awards by the actors in the past: 1-Yes or 0-No), ownership (public or 
private), past performance (a past nomination for the Golden Mask award), and governance structure 
(the presence or absence of the board of trustees). We detail below how our model controls for non-
observable factors at the theater level such as the actual quality of the aesthetic production that forms 
the basis of the aesthetic judgment formulated by peers. We add a control variable of institutional status 
of a theater that indicates the type of state subsidies given to a specific theater. The Russian government 
classifies all state owned theaters as either municipal, regional, federal or ministerial. Federal theaters 
are financed from the federal budget and are most heavily subsidized. Theaters with regional status 
directly rely on the regional budget, municipal and ministerial theaters receive the smallest fraction of 
public subsidies which are directly linked to their municipalities and ministries that own them (e.g. there 
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are several theaters that are on a balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense). Our random intercept 
specification controls for the heterogeneity in peers’ perceptions of theaters’ aesthetic offerings. In 
reality, under the present empirical setting it is impossible to disentangle peers’ general perception of a 
theater from their evaluation of its aesthetic offering14. This would require an experimental setting that 
would seriously compromise the external validity of the study. By also including into our regression 
model an exhaustive list of theater-level characteristics that may affect peers’ perception we make sure 
that random-intercept specification properly controls for aesthetic offering-level heterogeneity.  
  Finally, we control for unobserved factors across and within years, as well as region and city 
specific factors that may affect peer recognition. To consider changes in cultural climate, political 
fluctuations, and regional idiosyncrasies we include seven year dummies (from 2004 to 2011) and 70 
region dummies. We lag all time variant independent variables by one year.  
Method: To address the problem of overdispersion in our dependent variable, we use negative binomial 
specification of Poisson regression to test the presented hypotheses (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The 
dependent variable, the number of nominations in the national theater festival, is a count variable, which 
takes only discrete non-negative integer values and has a large number of zero values. To test our 
predictions about peer recognition and the interaction effects we use generalized estimating equations 
procedure for Poisson processes in a panel data setting. Here, we assume that the number of nominations 
a theater obtains per year obeys a Poisson distribution with a parameter specific to each theater (Baum, 
2006). Specifically, Ni,t  is assumed to be Poisson distributed with mean θiλi,t , i = 1, ...,N, t = 1, 
..., T. The expected annual nominations´ frequency is a product θiλi,t of a static factor θi times a 
dynamic factor λi,t. 
The former accounts for the dependence between observations relating to the same theater, 
while the latter introduces the observable characteristics (that are allowed to vary in time). In general, 
ln λi,t is expressed as a linear combination of the observable characteristics, that is: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 We thank one of the reviewers for this important observation 
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λi,t = exp(β0 + β′xi,t),  
where β0 is the intercept, β′ = (β1, . . . , βp) is a vector of regression parameters for explanatory 
variables xi,t = (xi,t,1, . . . , xi,t,p)′. 
In addition to Poisson specification, we also rely on Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
procedures to obtain first-stage estimates for our endogenous regressors as recommended by 
Wooldridge (2012) for multiplicative models with endogeneity issues. Furthermore, the advantage of 
this method over the control function method is established for count models with endogeneity as the 
former has less restrictive conditions on strict exogeneity of instruments.  
In the first and the second steps we use the full set of time period dummies. The application of 
generalized method of moments is also recommended for over-identified models with a large number 
of observations (Stock & Yogo, 2005).  In our tables, we report the results for the first and the second 
stage models.  
Finally, we restrain ourselves to mixed-effects model that account for random intercepts in 
theater’s peer recognition. This specification allows us to control for the unobservable heterogeneity in 
peers’ aesthetic evaluation of theatrical performances seeking nomination (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 
2013). As the aesthetic judgment constitutes an important part of overall peer recognition, we assume 
that the mean level of peers’ recognition will be systematically lower or higher for some theaters due 
to the observed differences in their aesthetic performances. This way our model controls for the quality 
of a theater offering and focuses on capturing the bias component in peer recognition rather than the 
whole peer recognition. 
Model specification, Estimation, and Robustness Checks: There are reasons to believe that the 
independent variable under study is endogenous: corporate donors do not support arts organizations at 
random, but make decisions of involvement based on factors that also relate to the likelihood of being 
nominated for awards. To confirm our suspicion of endogeneity of the independent variable we run a 
GMM regression that enables us to obtain the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Baum, 2006): 
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the null hypothesis that an ordinary least square method would yield consistent estimates is rejected at 
.05 level of significance in all instrumented models (see the first column of Table 4 for GMM 1st stage, 
in particular the bottom section). We perform the Wald test of exogeneity in logit models to back up 
the results from GMM endogeneity tests.   
To test the interaction effects we use the same two-stage specification with instrumental 
variables as recommended by Wooldridge (2010). First, we estimate a probit model for the selection 
indicator, where we include all exogenous variables including the variable determining selection. We 
use the density of theaters in a region as an exogenous variable that determines selection (the probability 
of getting a donor) and the ratio of profitable firms as the main instrumental variable. We then obtain 
the inverse Mills ratios and include them in the structural equation which we estimate following GMM 
procedure. 
To test our hypotheses, we rely on two instruments: ratio of profitable firms in the region to 
total number of firms and the density of theaters in a region. To ensure validity, our instruments have 
to meet two conditions: relevancy condition and exclusion restriction. 
The first condition for the percentage of profitable firms and the density of theaters to be valid 
instruments is that they significantly predict the number of corporate benefactors. There are economic 
reasons to expect such relations. The first instrument is the percentage of profitable firms in a region. 
We believe that in the context of our study, this variable most accurately captures regional economic 
development. First, it is highly correlated with regional GDP per capita, the variable conventionally 
used to access regional economic development. Second, in the context where philanthropic action is 
predominantly carried out by organizational and not individual donors, it has a more predictive power 
for an estimation of a number of donors. Moreover, previous research on corporate philanthropy and 
CSR in emerging markets demonstrates that economic performance of companies is a basic determinant 
of their willingness to support and engage in social initiatives (e.g. Blagov et al., 2008). The intensity 
and the proliferation of CSR practices are directly linked to regional economic growth. The density of 
theaters in a region is our second instrument. The intensity of competition for corporate donors will be 
higher in the regions with high density of theaters population. The fewer theaters a region has, the better 
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is the visibility of existing theaters and consequently, the higher are their chances to be considered for 
and obtain corporate support. The density also determines the amount of bargaining power theaters may 
enjoy in dealing with potential donors. 
It is important to estimate regressions of the number of donors on our two instruments with 
theater- and region-level controls to rule out the possibility that our instruments are correlated with 
some theater-level determinants of corporate donorship. It appears to be very unlikely - all theater 
characteristics are generic (and are thus not predictors of those two instrumental variables) and the 
density of theaters has a historical heritage determined long before the starting point of our analysis (the 
average age of a theater is 50 years). 
The second condition for our instruments validity (or exclusion condition) is that they affect the 
dependent variable only through their effect on the endogenous variable. There can be no correlation 
between the instruments and the second stage error. Density of theaters represents the intensity of 
competition for private economic resources available in the region and significantly predicts the 
likelihood of obtaining a donor. The effect on this variable on peer recognition is fully mediated by our 
endogenous variable; therefore there is no reason to suspect the violation of exclusion condition.  
  Regarding our second instrumental variable of the ratio of profitable firms: the more firms are 
profitable the more likely they are to use this slack to engage in sponsorship and philanthropic activities, 
and thus they only affect peer recognition through our independent variable of number of donors. 
Therefore, this instrumental variable also meets the exclusion condition. 
All relevant post-estimation statistics are reported in the bottom panel of Table 4 and Table 5. 
Results 
Direct effect of salience of ties with extraneous stakeholders on peer recognition (Hypothesis1):  
Table 3 provides summary statistics and pairwise correlation coefficients for all variables in the models.	  
We have carried out a number of multicollinearity tests for each combination of variables in our models. 
In all of them, VIF did not exceed the acceptable limit of 5 recommended in the literature (e.g. 
Rogerson, 2001). 
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------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
------------------------------------ 
Table 4 presents the results of regression equations for the two-step method of random intercept 
negative binomial model for 2,987 theater-year observations for Hypotheses 1, as well as for the sample 
of 1,105 theater-year observations (restricted to theaters with corporate donors) we use to test three 
moderation effects in Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. Model 1 is a baseline model with control variables, year 
and region dummies. We use panel specification for mixed effect Poisson regression with robust 
standard errors and control for over-dispersion. As expected, size, category, celebrity status of the cast 
and institutional status are all crucial predictors of theater’s peer recognition. Corporate benefactors are 
more likely to target theaters that are located in big cities which are publicly known and have a celebrity 
cast. As demonstrated earlier, genre or category (1- music theaters, 0 - drama theaters) also plays an 
important role in attracting corporate donors. Music theaters are more likely to be interested in and 
targeted for sponsorship purposes, whereas drama theaters tend to pursue an institution-centric type of 
relation. Finally, music theaters (opera and ballet) have more categories in which they can be nominated 
and less competition than drama theaters, thus they have better odds of receiving a nomination. Model 
2 tests the direct effect of the salience of the ties with corporate donors on peer recognition, where 
salience is a continuous endogenous variable measured as the total number of corporate benefactors. 
Models 3, 4, and 5 examine the moderating effects of breadth, depth and valence of the relationship 
with corporate donors. Model 6 tests the specification with full interaction effects to check the 
robustness of our findings. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
------------------------------------ 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that theaters with more salient ties with corporate benefactors as a stakeholder 
group will have lower levels of peer recognition (Model 2). The coefficient estimate of the variable of 
interest is negative, as predicted, and highly significant (p-value < .001). Theaters with a more salient 
tie with corporate benefactors will receive lower peer recognition if other predictors are kept constant. 
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The results of post-estimation tests available for GMM model confirm the endogeneity of our variable 
of interest (the p-value of Durbin-Wu-Hausman component is .054). To facilitate the interpretation of 
the results, we obtain the exponentiated regression coefficient (or incidence rate ratio) for our variable 
of interest (exp (-0.149)). The estimates suggest that the acquisition of one additional corporate donor 
decreases the incidence rate of obtaining peer recognition by more than 10% in a time period.  
Moderating effects of breadth, depth and valence: Hypothesis 2 disaggregates the effect of 
corporate involvement based on its type. Model 3 (Table 4) contains the results of coefficient 
estimations that measure the accentuating effect of breadth of the relationship on peer recognition.  We 
use project-centric support as the baseline model and the interaction term measures the effect of 
institution-centric support or the breadth of involvement. We find support for the hypothesis 2, the 
interaction term is negative and highly significant (p-value <.001). The breadth of involvement with 
extraneous stakeholders, engendered in institution-centric collaboration with corporate donors, 
aggravates the negative perception of field’s internal stakeholders and reduces theater’s peer 
recognition. Figures 1a and 1b provide some interesting insights: the breadth of involvement most 
strongly accentuates the negative effect of salience on peer recognition for theaters with a smaller 
number of donors. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1a and 1b About Here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 Figure 1b contains the exponentiated marginal effects, where higher positive values within the 
range from 0 to 1 are associated with smaller negative effects and vice versa (Figure 1a facilitates the 
interpretation). It demonstrates that the breadth of involvement is the most problematic for theaters with 
1 to 3 donors and that the accentuation of the negative effect reaches plateau when a theatre obtains 
more than three donors. These results make intuitive sense: one or two donors with a lot of influence 
may be perceived as having oligopolistic power, whereas the qualitative difference between four or five 
donors with partnership rights stops being such a nuance as to further aggravate peers’ judgment. We 
can call this phenomenon “a trend of diminishing negativity” or “entropy of negativity”. 
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  In a similar fashion, model 4 shows support for hypothesis 3, as the interaction term between 
the number of donors and the longest tie is negative and significant at the p < 0.01 level. This result 
suggests that combining pervasive and long-term relationships is most harmful for theaters, and 
focusing on shorter length of relationship (more limited depth) attenuates the negative effect of the 
salience of the relationship with donors. To visually interpret these results, we categorize our variable 
to contain three levels of depth - low (the duration of the longest tie with a corporate donor is from 0 to 
4 years); moderate (from 4 to 8 years) and high (longer than 8 years). Figures 2a and 2b reveal the trend 
similar to the case of breadth: the magnitude of accentuation of the negative effect of salience by depth 
of the relationship with extraneous stakeholders is the highest for theaters with fewer donors.  
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2a and 2b About Here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Model 5 tests for the interaction between the negative valence of the ties, captured as the number of 
donors from tainted industries, and the salience of the ties. We find that here as well, the number of 
donors from tainted industries accentuates the negative effect of the ties with donors on peer recognition 
as the interaction term is negative and significant (p < 0.05). Figures 3a and 3b demonstrate that valence 
intensifies the negative effect of salience at all levels gradually decreasing for theaters with a larger 
number of donors. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 3a and 3b About Here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Model 6 includes all our variables and interactions. The interaction term between breadth and 
salience is still negative and significant (p < 0.001), and same goes for the interaction between depth 
and salience (p < 0.05). 
Finally, to ensure the robustness of our results we test our hypotheses on a different dependent 
variable – the likelihood of obtaining a nomination for the Golden Mask award. Table 5 provides the 
results of two-stage logit regressions with a random intercept. As can be observed, the results of Poisson 
and logit models generally converge although the latter exhibit lower levels of significance.  
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DISCUSSION 
In contrast to prior management research on corporate philanthropy – which has focused on the benefits 
that private firms may derive from participating in social initiatives – this study examines how recipient 
organizations can actually manage the social consequences of their ties with corporate donors. In this 
study, we explore how cultural organizations that have ties with private corporations suffer from not 
adhering to the “disavowal of the economy” (Bourdieu, 1993) that characterizes the cultural field; as 
such, these organizations are penalized by peers for ostensibly distancing themselves from established 
norms.  
Furthermore, we look at how the negative signal of sustaining relationships with adversely 
perceived stakeholders can be mitigated. Cultural organizations that pursue an institution-centric 
collaboration exhibit a greater allegiance with their corporate benefactors, which accentuates the 
negative bias affecting peer recognition for a large number of benefactors. Cultural organizations that 
build more fragmented relationships, i.e. project-centric forms of collaboration, are engaged in less 
pervasive relationships and thus preserve their image of authenticity. We also discuss the aggravating 
role of the longevity of the relationship with corporate donors as it suggests an even stronger attachment 
to outside agents. Finally, we show that organizations with donors from tainted industries suffer further 
from an adverse bias.  
Contributions 
 Our work makes three main contributions: Firstly, we enrich not only existing theoretical 
frameworks of stakeholder theory and institutional logics, but also the emerging intersection and cross-
fertilization between the two (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; Doh & Guay, 2006). Secondly, our work 
contributes to the growing body of work on social evaluations in management by focusing on peer 
recognition, a concept imported from sociology and offering additional opportunities to capture field-
specific institutional mechanisms (Cattani et al., 2014). Thirdly, this study supplements the 
understanding of the phenomenon of corporate philanthropy both from a theoretical and a practical 
perspective. 
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Contributions to stakeholder theory: The seminal work of Donaldson & Preston (1995) called for 
more empirical work on stakeholder relationships. Our work explores how a multiplicity of stakeholders 
creates a multitude of potentially conflicting pressures (Frooman, 1999), especially as we distinguish 
stakeholders within and outside an organizational field. As their demands may conflict, their influence 
strategies on the focal organizations become antagonizing. Because the diverse influences of 
stakeholders might be a reaction to each other, it is impossible to study them in isolation (Rowley, 
1997). This is particularly true in the field of cultural production as the collective nature of cultural 
goods places their producers “at the intersection of a fragmented web of interests” (Pache & Santos, 
2010: 472). We follow the suggestion of Hillman et al. (2009: 1417) to combine the “recognition of the 
multiplexity of dependencies with the insights from theory regarding stakeholder importance”.  
The boundaries of the organizational field can be a crucial determinant to explain the 
antagonisms between groups of stakeholders, considering that legitimacy is field based (Cattani & 
Feriani, 2008) and constitutes a fundamental resource (Drees & Heugens, 2013). In the case of corporate 
philanthropy in the arts sector, peers (within the field) and benefactors (outside the field) are the two 
sets of “salient” stakeholders (Mitchell, et al. 1997; Neville, et al. 2011): peers hold the legitimacy to 
consecrate and thus the power to delegitimize the cultural production of some organizations, while 
corporate benefactors represent the urgency of obtaining resources that are essential for sustaining the 
organization’s productive activities. This gives rise to a rope-pulling phenomenon with cultural 
organizations torn between two antagonistic sets of stakeholders: benefactors who control resources 
and peers who want to keep actors of the field immune from “corruptive” external influences – a 
struggle rooted in the opposition between economic and symbolic capital documented by Bourdieu 
(1993). The more polarized normative orientations are of external and internal orders, the more likely 
we are to observe tensions in organization’s quest for self-preservation (Bell, 2008). Our work shows 
that one solution for the recipient organizations is to pay lip service to the field by circumscribing their 
links with extraneous stakeholders. In this sense, our work contributes to the understanding of 
stakeholder relationships by conceptualizing three dimensions that moderate the effect of salience: 
breadth, depth and valence. For example, we show that theaters can favor a project-centric collaboration 
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which suggests limited breadth of the relationship with the corporate donor. On the contrary, longer-
lasting ties hint at a more profound relationship with the negatively perceived group of stakeholders. 
This is exactly the opposite of co-optation (Pache & Santos, 2010): cultural organizations can override 
the ruling attempts of stakeholders outside their fields to preserve their relationship with peers. Finally, 
we show that there is a variance within the group of negatively perceived stakeholders: some industries 
are more tainted than others and this fact accentuates the negative perception of the organizations 
exhibiting a link with them. These findings indicate that stakeholder theory will benefit from further 
integrating the concept of organizational stigma (Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Roulet, 2015) and 
stakeholders’ “mental representations” (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016).  
Contributions to the social evaluation literature: In the context of cultural fields, the attribution of 
positive social evaluation relies on the ability of social actors to comply with the normative expectations 
of their field (Bourdieu, 1993; Lamont, 2012). Thus, understanding the mechanisms through which 
social evaluations are formed requires an institutional approach. In the meantime, the sociology of 
evaluation can offer a broader framework to articulate key concepts used in the management literature 
such as categorization or legitimization processes (Lamont, 2012). Peer recognition is a directly 
“consumed” social evaluation and in this way it differs from traditionally studied concepts such as status 
or reputation. However, the concept of peer recognition relies on field-specific mechanisms of 
consecration (Cattani, et al. 2014) and thus gives a more crucial importance to institutional prescriptions 
in the formation of the evaluation. The process of peer recognition is self-reinforcing because it relies 
on the institutionalization of tools such as awards or rankings (Allen & Parson, 2006), and is hence 
more likely to lead to what Zuckerman (2012) calls “socially endogenous inference” – a self-reinforcing 
and path-dependent evaluation. 
In addition, our work also responds to Lamont’s (2012) call for more research on the treatment 
of information in evaluative practices, considering the key role it plays in the creation, formation and 
consumption of social evaluations. In our case, stakeholder relationships can only affect the expert 
judgment because they form a part of the information directly available to an expert. By isolating the 
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piece of information on which social evaluations are based, further research could facilitate our 
understanding of how this information can be manipulated or distorted.  
Contribution to institutional theory: Proximity to a dominant logic is crucial for organizations (Glynn 
& Lounsbury, 2005) enabling them to obtain what Bourdieu called “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 1993) 
and what we conceptualize as peer recognition (Cattani et al., 2014). Organizations that are seen as 
closer to the dominant logic receive more positive evaluations, which are of primary importance to the 
field of cultural production where ambiguity reigns over the evaluation of organizational performance 
(Hirsch, 1972). 
 Building on these elements, our work contributes in two ways to the literature on institutional 
theory, and more specifically, to the concept of institutional logics. Firstly, we bridge the gap between 
the concept of organizational field and institutional logics by arguing that organizations can be situated 
depending on their proximity to the dominant logic of the field, or in other words, on the degree to 
which they relate to core values and norms of the field. Organizations that pledge allegiance to adversely 
perceived stakeholders outside the field distance themselves from their peers and are seen as less likely 
to abide by the institutional prescriptions of the field. Secondly, we develop the importance of signaling 
and provide a broader sociological account of evaluation to understand the institutional dynamics within 
fields. We argue that there are signaling mechanisms through which actors interpret organizations’ 
proximity with an institutional prescription. Organizations are evaluated for their proximity to norms 
which conditions their access to resources inside and outside the field. Our work demonstrates how 
organizations can deviate from an institutional ideal while controlling the signal to attenuate the 
negative evaluative consequences. Further research in institutional theory would benefit from a greater 
focus on the circulation of information and signaling. 
Contributions to the literature on philanthropy, CSR and implications for practice: Our work also 
contributes to the broader understanding of corporate philanthropy as a phenomenon (Wang & Qian, 
2011). We investigate recipients – a hitherto unexamined group – as well as the organizational fields in 
which they operate, in the lineage of Bourdieu (1977; 1993). Extensive corporate donorship can have a 
negative impact on the perception of recipient cultural organizations by their peers. Cultural 
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organizations may be discouraged to rely on corporate donors. In turn, potential corporate donors may 
start looking at other opportunities of corporate social action, as there is usually no shortage of such 
opportunities. This can create a vicious circle in which particularly closed off fields may progressively 
lose any access to external resources.  
Our research also questions the relationship between philanthropy and corporate performance: 
corporate social responsibility is usually assumed to be creating value for the stakeholders targeted by 
the firm (Wang & Qian, 2011). This process ultimately generates a higher performance for both parties 
as stakeholders tend to “reward” the responsible firm (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Our findings show 
that stakeholder responses to corporate social responsibility (in our case the responses of the recipients), 
and consequently, the generation of stakeholder value, may not always be as straightforward as assumed 
in the management literature (Godfrey, 2005). The context of our study reveals that corporate support 
destroys value for the recipient stakeholder by harming its chances to get peer recognition. In this sense, 
our work informs the broader literature on the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and performance and the inconclusive results regarding this relationship (Margolis & Walsh, 
2003): being socially responsible does not necessarily generate value for the firm’s stakeholders (and 
thus firm performance), especially when commercial interests enter an arena in which they are 
negatively perceived. To understand the link between CSR and firm performance, rather than assuming 
that CSR indiscriminately generates stakeholder value, it is crucial to critically examine under which 
conditions this process of value creation takes place. Finally, our work distinguishes two forms of 
relationships with corporate benefactors and points out the advantages of a project-based approach to 
corporate philanthropy. 
Generalizability, Limitations and Future Research 
Our work is not free from limitations. In particular, the external validity of our findings deserves to be 
discussed, considering we look at the specific national context of Russia. Our rich empirical context 
clearly exhibits the antagonisms between stakeholders within and outside the organizational field. This 
friction is fueled by the fact corporate interests are traditionally despised by the intellectual and cultural 
elite of Russia. Only a limited amount of management research has looked at the theater industry outside  
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the empirical work by Glenn and Zannie Voss (among which Voss & Voss, 2000 or Voss et al., 2008): 
our study however takes a more macro approach to this field, which makes our peculiar national context 
an asset.  
Typical studies on logics focus on fields with one dominant logic (Lounsbury, 2007) and our 
study does fit this criteria. In this sense, our context offered a clean empirical setting to explore the 
impact of external resources on intra-field evaluations. What would happen however if several logics 
were fighting for dominance over the organizational field? We could expect some logics to be more 
sympathetic to external resource providers generating additional complexity for the strategic 
management of stakeholder relationships (Greenwood et al., 2011; Durand & Jourdan, 2012).  
We did not theorize the impact of corporate benefactors on the activity of theaters and how it 
affects the content of their artistic production, although we empirically isolate that effect by using a 
random intercept specification. Theoretically, we preferred to focus on the biases affecting the 
judgments of peers, thus drawing closer attention to the subjective nature of social evaluations. The 
reliance on corporate funding causes several changes in organizational structure and behavior of non-
profit organizations: it can shift board composition and increase complexity, formalization, 
professionalization and bureaucratization (Stone, 1996; Froelich, 1999). These changes occur as non-
profit organizations “reorient themselves toward their corporate funders, creating and developing the 
expertise and administrative infrastructure necessary to secure, manage and sustain that funding…” 
(Chaves et al., 2004:296). In a similar manner, Jourdan & Kivleniece (Forthcoming) show that state 
sponsorship directly affects the performance of cultural organizations because it modifies their resource 
allocation. In our case, it could be argued that theaters change the nature of their production by either 
lowering or increasing the aesthetic quality of their plays to make them more attuned to the tastes of 
existing or potential corporate donors. Empirically, we believe our set of instrumental variables, our 
econometric model with random intercepts, and the performed robustness checks rule out any 
endogeneity concerns. Our findings might capture some strategies of self-selection by theaters: some 
cultural organizations may have opted for a purely commercial strategy, focusing on the acquisition of 
corporate donors while ignoring peers’ evaluation. While the random intercepts and the control 
variables at the theater level do capture the heterogeneity in the theaters’ strategy, it would be interesting 
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to look at the effect of corporate donorship on the aesthetic quality of the production at the field level. 
If theaters decide to lower the aesthetic quality of their output to acquire donors, our findings suggest 
that this will deprive them of symbolic capital. Will theaters be able to survive without symbolic capital? 
This might actually deter corporate donors, and be impractical in the long-term. In a self-perpetuating 
cycle, the subjective biases against privately supported theaters can end up depriving theaters from 
corporate resources, and ultimately harming the quality of their output. Considering how strongly 
intertwined are subjective and objective evaluations of cultural products, future research could look at 
further disentangling them. Such endeavor, however, would require a setting in which objective and 
subjective judgements can be clearly distinguished, and there is a variance in the balance between those 
two components. In the context of Olympic games, Waguespack & Salomon (2015) have found that 
evaluators tend to rely more on past appraisal when judgment has a stronger subjective component. 
They also suggest that subjectivity triggers identity-related mechanisms. Subjective and objective 
judgments thus rely on and trigger different mechanisms, that remain to be fully understood. 
Despite our apparently narrow empirical context, we believe our theoretical framework can be 
applied to other industries outside the cultural field and also in other countries. In short, the boundary 
conditions for the applicability of our theory are the existence of a dominant logic and the relative 
isolation of the field from external actors. Contested industries and stigmatized fields could be good 
candidates for further exploration of those questions in other contexts (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Piazza 
& Perretti, 2015; Roulet, 2015). It would also be interesting for future research to test our theory in 
other national contexts and domains that do not fit those boundary conditions. Finally, future studies 
could examine more closely other aspects of corporate support and other outcomes for cultural 
organizations such as innovation (Godart et al., 2015). 
CONCLUSION  
Our work unveils the negative side of corporate philanthropy: unless cultural organizations mitigate the 
negative signal by manipulating the characteristics of their relationship with donors, they suffer from a 
negative bias and are less likely to receive peer recognition. While cultural organizations can engage in 
mitigating strategies to display a less pervasive affiliation with corporate donors, they will still be 
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penalized in the eyes of their peers. This study reveals an important paradox for cultural organizations: 
they require corporate donors to enhance the quality of their aesthetic offering, but this enhancement 
might be offset by the loss of field-level legitimacy. This research also confirms that the disengagement 
of the state, such as in the example of the Russian Federation, can trigger a risk for cultural deterioration 
as innovative productions can be silenced by the field, when they are ostensibly supported by private 
interests.  
 
 
 
	   	  
47	  
	  
REFERENCES 
Allen, M. P., & Parsons, N. L. 2006. The institutionalization of fame: achievement, recognition, and 
cultural consecration in baseball. American Sociological Review, 71(5), 808-825. 
Alexander, V. D. 1996. From philanthropy to funding: The effects of corporate and public support on 
American art museums. Poetics, 24(2), 87-129 
Amezcua, A. S., Grimes, M. G., Bradley, S. W., & Wiklund, J. (2013). Organizational sponsorship 
and founding environments: A contingency view on the survival of business-incubated firms, 
1994–2007. Academy of Management Journal, 56(6), 1628-1654. 
Anand, N., Gardner, H. K., & Morris, T. 2007. Knowledge-based innovation: Emergence and 
embedding of new practice areas in management consulting firms. Academy of Management 
Journal, 50(2), 406-428. 
Anheier, H. K., Gerhards, J., & Romo, F. P. 1995. Forms of capital and social structure in cultural 
fields: Examining Bourdieu's social topography. American Journal of Sociology, 859-903. 
Bargenda, A. 2004. The Business of Art : Corporate Sponsorship in the Cultural Sector. Le Cahiers 
de Recherche (4). 
Baum, C. F. 2006. An introduction to modern econometrics using Stata. College Station: T.X.: Stata 
Corp. 
Bell, D. 2008. The cultural contradictions of capitalism. Basic Books. 
Blagov, Y., Dynin, A. & Ivanova, T. 2008 Report on Social Investments in 
Russia.Integrating CSR principles into Corporate Strategy. The UN Global 
Compact.United Nations Development Programme. 
Boerner, S. & Jobst, J. 2011: Stakeholder Management and Program Planning in German Public 
Theatres. Nonprofit Management and Leadership 22(1), 67-84. 
Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge university press. 
Bourdieu, P. 1993. The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature: Polity Press. 
Brammer, S., & Millington, A. 2005. Corporate reputation and philanthropy: An empirical 
analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 61(1), 29-44. 
Bridoux, F., & Stoelhorst, J. W. 2016. Stakeholder relationships and social welfare: A behavioral 
theory of contributions to joint value creation. Academy of Management Review, 41(2), 229-
251 
Cameron, A. C. & Trivedi, P. 2005. Microeconometrics. Cambridge University Press. 
Cattani, G., & Ferriani, S. 2008. A core/periphery perspective on individual creative performance: 
Social networks and cinematic achievements in the Hollywood film industry. Organization 
Science, 19(6), 824-844. 
Cattani, G., Ferriani, S., & Allison, P. D. 2014. Insiders, Outsiders, and the Struggle for Consecration 
in Cultural Fields A Core-Periphery Perspective. American Sociological Review. 
Chaves, M., Stephens, L. & Galaskiewicz, J.. 2004. Does Government Funding Supress Nonprofits' 
Political Activity?  American Sociological  Review, 69(2): 292–316. 
Clemente, M., & Roulet, T. J. 2015. Public opinion as a source of deinstitutionalization: A “spiral of 
silence” approach. Academy of Management Review, 40(1), 96-114. 
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. 2011. Signaling theory: A review and 
assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 39-67. 
DiMaggio, P. J. 2011. Cultural Networks. p. 286– 300 in The Sage Handbook of Social Network 
Analysis, edited by J. Scott and P. J. Carrington. London: Sage Publications.  
DiMaggio, P. J., & Mukhtar, T. 2004. Arts participation as cultural capital in the United States, 1982-
2002: Signs of Decline? Poetics, 32(2): 169-194. 
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell W. 1983 ‘The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields’. American Sociological Review 48: 147–160. 
DiStefano, G., King, A., & Verona, G. 2015. Sanctioning in the wild: Rational calculus and 
retributive instincts in gourmet cuisine. Academy of Management Journal. 
48	  
	  
Doh, J. P., & Guay, T. R. 2006. Corporate social responsibility, public policy, and NGO activism in 
Europe and the United States: an institutional stakeholder perspective. Journal of 
Management Studies, 43(1), 47-73. 
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, 
and implications. Academy of management Review, 20(1), 65-91. 
Drees, J. M., & Heugens, P. P. 2013. Synthesizing and Extending Resource Dependence Theory A 
Meta-Analysis. Journal of Management, 0149206312471391. 
Driscoll, C., & Starik, M. (2004). The primordial stakeholder: Advancing the conceptual 
consideration of stakeholder status for the natural environment. Journal of business 
ethics, 49(1), 55-73. 
Durand, R.  & Jourdan, J. 2012. Jules or Jim? Alternative Conformity to Minority Logic. Academy of 
Management Journal, 55(6):1295-1315. 
Durand, R., & Kremp, P. A. 2015. Classical Deviation: Organizational and Individual Status as 
Antecedents of Conformity. Academy of Management Journal. 
Durand, R., Szostak, B., Jourdan, J., & Thornton, P. H. 2013. Institutional logics as strategic 
resources. Institutional logics in action, Part: Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 
39, 165-201 
Durand, R., & Vergne, J. P. 2015. Asset divestment as a response to media attacks in stigmatized 
industries. Strategic Management Journal, 36(8), 1205-1223. 
Edmondson, A. C., & McManus, S. E. 2007. Methodological fit in management field 
research. Academy of management review, 32(4), 1246-1264. 
Freeman, R. E. 2010. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Cambridge University Press. 
Froelich, K.A . 1999. "Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in 
Nonprofit Organizations. Nonprofita and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28:246-68. 
Frooman, J. 1999. Stakeholder influence strategies. Academy of management review, 24(2), 191-205. 
Galvin, T. L., Ventresca, M. J., & Hudson, B. A. 2004. Contested industry dynamics. International 
Studies of Management & Organization, 34(4), 56-82. 
Godart, F. C., Maddux, W. W., Shipilov, A. V., & Galinsky, A. D. 2015. Fashion with a foreign flair: 
Professional experiences abroad facilitate the creative innovations of organizations. Academy 
of Management Journal, 58(1), 195-220. 
Godfrey, P. C. 2005. The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder wealth: A risk 
management perspective. Academy of Management Review, 30(4), 777-798. 
Gomulya, D., & Mishina, Y. 2016. Signaler credibility, signal susceptibility, and relative reliance on 
signals: How stakeholders change their evaluative processes after violation of expectations 
and rehabilitative efforts. Academy of Management Journal. 
Glynn, M.A. 2000 When Cymbals Become Symbols: Conflict Over Organizational Identity Withint a 
Symphony Orchestra. Organization Science, 11(3):285-298 
Glynn, M. A. & Lounsbury, M. 2005. From the Critics' Corner: Logic Blending, 
             Discursive Change and Authenticity in a Cultural Production System. Journal 
             of Management Studies, 42(5): 1031-1055. 
Googins, B. K. & S. A. Rochlin, S.A. 2000. Creating the partnership society:   
           Understanding the rhetoric and reality of cross-sectoral. Business & Society 
           Review, 105(1): 127. 
Granovetter, M. S. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American journal of sociology, 1360-1380. 
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. and Lounsbury, M.2011. Institutional 
Complexity and Organizational Responses. The Academy of Management Annals,5(1):317-
371. 
Helms, W. S., & Patterson, K. D. 2014. Eliciting Acceptance For “Illicit” Organizations: The Positive 
Implications of Stigma for MMA Organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 57(5), 
1453-1484. 
Henderson, J.C. 2003. Government and the arts: a framework for analysis. Managing 
Leisure,8(1):121-132 
49	  
	  
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. 2009. Resource dependence theory: A review. 
Journal of Management, 35: 1404-1427. 
Hirsch, P. M. 1972. ‘Processing fads and fashions: an organization-set analysis of cultural industry 
systems’. American Journal of Sociology, 77, 639–59. 
Hochwarter, W. A., Ferris, G. R., Zinko, R., Arnell, B., & James, M. 2007. Reputation as a moderator 
of political behavior-work outcomes relationships: a two-study investigation with convergent 
results. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(2), 567. 
Hsieh, J. 2010. Strategic stakeholder orientations and performance consequences—a case of private 
nonprofit performing arts in the US. International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Marketing, 15(1), 13-27. 
Jourdan, J., & Kivleniece, I. Forthcoming. Too much of a good thing? The dual effect of public 
sponsorship on organizational performance. Academy of Management Journal. 
Kassinis, G., & Vafeas, N. 2002. Corporate boards and outside stakeholders as determinants of 
environmental litigation. Strategic management journal, 23(5), 399-415. 
Kodeih, F., & Greenwood, R. 2014. Responding to institutional complexity: The role of 
identity. Organization Studies, 35(1), 7-39. 
Korschun, D. 2015. Boundary-Spanning Employees and Relationships with External Stakeholders: A 
Social Identity Approach. Academy of Management Review, 40(4), 611-629. 
Kremp, P. A. 2010. Innovation and selection: symphony orchestras and the construction of the 
musical canon in the United States (1879–1959). Social Forces, 88(3), 1051-1082. 
Lamont, M. 2009. How professors think: Inside the curious world of academic judgment. Harvard 
University Press. 
Lamont, M. 2012. Toward a comparative sociology of valuation and evaluation. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 38(1), 201. 
Leach, R., & Borovsky,V. 2008. A History of Russian Theatre. Cambridge University Press. 
Lounsbury, M. 2007. A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in the 
professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2), 289-307. 
Luoma, P., & Goodstein, J. 1999. Research Notes. Stakeholders and Corporate Boards: Institutional 
Influences on Board Composition and Structure. Academy of management journal, 42(5), 
553-563. 
Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. 2003. Misery loves companies: Rethinking social initiatives by 
business. Administrative science quarterly, 48(2), 268-305. 
Marquis, C. Davis, G. F. , Glynn, M.A.2013 Golfing alone? Corporations, Elites, and Nonprofit 
Growth in 100 American Communities. Organization Science, 24(1):39-57 
Miller, T., & Yudice, G. 2002. Cultural Policy (Core Cultural Theorists Series): Sage Publications 
Ltd. 
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and 
salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of management 
review, 22(4), 853-886. 
Moir, L., & Taffler, R. 2004. Does corporate philanthropy exist?: business giving to the arts in the 
UK. Journal of Business Ethics, 54(2), 149-161. 
Neville, B. A., Bell, S. J., & Whitwell, G. J. 2011. Stakeholder salience revisited: Refining, 
redefining, and refueling an underdeveloped conceptual tool. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 102(3), 357-378. 
Oliver, C. 1991. Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of management 
review, 16(1), 145-179. 
Oliver, C., & Holzinger, I. 2008. The effectiveness of strategic political management: A dynamic 
capabilities framework. Academy of Management Review, 33(2), 496-520. 
Pache, A. C., & Santos, F. 2010. When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational 
responses to conflicting institutional demands. Academy of Management Review, 35(3), 455-
476. 
50	  
	  
Piazza, A., & Perretti, F. 2015. Categorical Stigma and Firm Disengagement: Nuclear Power 
Generation in the United States, 1970–2000. Organization Science. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. 2002. The competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy. Harvard 
business review, 80(12), 56-68. 
Rabe-Hesketh, S., & Skrondal, A. 2013. Avoiding biased versions of Wooldridge’s simple solution to 
the initial conditions problem. Economics Letters, 120(2), 346-349. 
Reuer, J. J., Tong, T. W., & Wu, C. W. 2012. A signaling theory of acquisition premiums: Evidence 
from IPO targets. Academy of Management Journal, 55(3), 667-683. 
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. 1994. Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational 
relationships. Academy of management review,19(1), 90-118. 
Rogerson, P. A. 2001. Statistical methods for geography. London: Sage. 
Roulet, T. 2015. “What Good is Wall Street?” Institutional Contradiction and the Diffusion of the 
Stigma over the Finance Industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 130(2), 389-402. 
Roulet, T. J., & Touboul, S. 2015. The intentions with which the road is paved: Attitudes to liberalism 
as determinants of greenwashing. Journal of Business Ethics, 128(2), 305-320. 
Rowley, T. J. 1997. Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder influences. 
Academy of management Review, 22(4), 887-910. 
Sanders, W. M., & Boivie, S. 2004. Sorting things out: Valuation of new firms in uncertain markets. 
Strategic Management Journal, 25(2): 167-186.  
Salganik, M. J., Dodds, P. S., & Watts, D. J. 2006. Experimental study of inequality and 
unpredictability in an artificial cultural market. Science,311(5762), 854-856. 
Schwartz D. 1997. Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: Univ. Chicago 
Press   
Scott, W. R. 2013. Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities. Sage Publications. 
Spence, M. 1973. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 355-374. 
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. 2005. Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. NBER 
Technical Working Paper. 
Stone, M. M. 1996. Competing Contexts: The Evolution of a Nonprofit Organization's Governance 
System in Multiple Environments. Administration and Society, 28:61-89. 
Thomson, P. 2014. Field. in Grenfell, M. J. (Ed.). (2014). Pierre Bourdieu: key concepts. Routledge. 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. 2008. Institutional logics. The Sage handbook of organizational 
institutionalism, 840, 99-128. 
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. 2012. The institutional logics perspective: A new 
approach to culture, structure, and process. Oxford University Press. 
Townley, B. 2002. The Role of Competing Rationalities in Institutional Change.Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(1):163-179 
Useem, M., & Kutner, S. I. 1986. Corporate contributions to culture and the arts: The organization of 
giving and the influence of the chief executive officer and of other firms on company 
contributions in Massachusetts. Nonprofit enterprise in the arts: Studies in mission and 
constraint, 93-112. 
Voss, G.B. and Voss, Z.G. 2000. Strategic Orientation and firm performance in an artistic 
environment. The Journal of Marketing:67-83 
Voss, G. B., Sirdeshmukh, D., & Voss, Z. G. 2008. The Effects of Slack Resources and 
Environmentalthreat on Product Exploration and Exploitation. Academy of Management 
Journal, 51(1), 147-164. 
Waguespack, D. M., & Salomon, R. 2015. Quality, Subjectivity, and Sustained Superior Performance 
at the Olympic Games. Management Science, 62(1), 286-300. 
Wang, H., & Qian, C. 2011. Corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance: The roles of 
stakeholder response and political access. Academy of Management Journal, 54(6), 1159-
1181. 
Weiss, A. M., & Kurland, N. 1997. Holding distribution channel relationships together: The role of 
51	  
	  
transaction-specific assets and length of prior relationship. Organization Science, 8: 612–623.  
Wooldridge, J. 2012. Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Cengage Learning. 
Wooldrisge, J.2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press 
Zuckerman, E. W. 1999. The categorical imperative: Securities analysts and the illegitimacy 
discount. American journal of sociology, 104(5), 1398-1438. 
Zuckerman, E. W. 2012. Construction, concentration, and (dis) continuities in social 
valuations. Annual Review of Sociology, 38, 223-245. 
 
 
  
52	  
	  
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1a 
Interaction Plot of Salience and Peer Recognition conditional on two levels of Breadth of relationship 
	    
FIGURE 1b 
Predicted marginal effect of salience (number of corporate donors) on peer recognition conditional on 
two levels of Breadth of relationship  
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FIGURE 2a 
Interaction Plot of Salience and Peer Recognition conditional on three levels of depth of relationship 
                    
 
FIGURE 2b 
Predicted marginal effect of salience (number of corporate donors) on peer recognition conditional on 
three levels of depth of relationship  
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FIGURE 3a 
Interaction Plot of Salience and Peer Recognition conditional on three levels of negative valence of     
relationship 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3b 
Predicted marginal effect of salience (number of corporate donors) on peer recognition conditional on 
three levels of negative valence of relationship  
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TABLE 1 
Qualitative Data Collection 
Data Sources Type of Data Use in the Analysis 
Field related 
publications 
-­‐   Two books types: a) books on 
the history of Russian theater 
in the 20th century (n=2); b) 
books by top artistic directors 
(n=3); 
-­‐   Articles in national and 
international press; 
-­‐   including interviews of 
relevant personalities  
-­‐   Academic literature on 
national cultural policies and 
corporate philanthropy; 
-­‐   Understand the formation of social norms 
and professional standards of the field; 
 
-­‐   Understand the impact of a change in the 
national cultural policy on field actors; 
 
-­‐   Understand the constitution of symbolic 
capital and peer recognition 
 
-­‐   Understand the specificity of philanthropy 
in the context of Russian Federation 
Interviews  First round with primary data 
collection: 7 interviews of key 
informants in theater industry, with 
follow up sessions. Spring-Summer 
2012; Second Round – Spring 2013 
-­‐   Investigate functioning and enforcement 
of field norms and professional standards  
 
-­‐   Comprehend the construct and 
measurement of peer recognition 
Archival 
sources 
-­‐   Records of nominations and 
nominees; 
-­‐   Records of awards; 
-­‐   Records of the Golden Mask 
jury composition 
-­‐   Triangulate interview data 
 
-­‐   Understand the constitutive norms and 
processes of peer recognition 
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TABLE 2 
Details on the construction of the variables 
 Variable Description Measure 
Dependent 
variables 
Total Nominations The total number of nominations 
obtained in the annual Golden 
Mask Festival 
Count 
Nomination The fact of being nominated for 
an award in the annual Golden 
Mask Festival 
Categorical 
(yes/no) 
Control 
variables 
Age Number of years since the 
theater’s foundation 
Continuous  
Size Number of seats Continuous variable 
Past performance Previous nominations in the 
Golden Mask Festival 
Categorical  (yes/no) 
Presence of 
celebrity cast in 
theatre’s offering 
TV and film stars with previous 
awards in the field of visual arts 
Categorical  ( yes/no) 
State owned Type of ownership Categorical (1- state 
owned; 0 - private) 
Category Music or Drama Genre Categorical 
(1-   Music; 0- 
Drama) 
Board of Trustees Governance structure  Categorical 
(1-   Presence of the 
board; 0 – 
absence) 
Federal Highest institutional status of a 
state theaters, a proxy for the 
amount of subsidies 
Categorical 
(1-   Yes; 0- no) 
Regional Second highest Categorical 
Municipal Third highest Categorical 
Main 
independent 
variable 
Salience of the 
Stakeholder 
Relationship 
Total number of corporate 
donors 
Instrumented in two 
stage procedure with 
two instruments: 
density of theaters in a 
region and the number 
of profitable firms in a 
region 
Moderating 
variables 
Breadth of the 
Relationship 
The type of collaboration with a 
corporate donor: sponsorship or 
partnership 
Categorical (1- 
partnership; 0-
sponsorship) 
Depth of the 
Relationship 
The longest tie with a corporate 
donor 
Years of collaboration 
Valence of the 
Relationship 
Number of corporate donors 
from mining and extraction 
industries 
Count 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
  mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Total	  nominations 0.26 1.34                
2 Nomination 0.05 0.21 0.79*               
3 Age 49.1 50.21 0.17* 0.1*              
4 Category 0.12 0.42 0.15* 0.12* -­‐0.1*             
5 Size 337 5.76 0.18* 0.14* 0.48* 0.19*            
6 State	  owned 0.87 0.34 0.05* 0.11 0.31* 0.11* 0.31*           
7 Federal 0.04 0.21 0.38* 0.29* 0.01 0.02 0.32* 0.79*          
8 Celebrity	  cast 0.35 0.48 0.19* 0.21* 0.06* 0.1 0.16* 0.32* 0.24*         
9 Board	  of	  trustees 0.06 0.24 -­‐0.13* -­‐0.09* -­‐0.16* -­‐0.04 -­‐0.1 -­‐0.11* 0.12* 0.05*        
10 Salience	  (№	  of	  crp	  dns)** 0.91 1.51 0.13* 0.13* 0.08* 0.06 0.21* 0.08 0.09* 0.16* 0.6*       
11 Breadth** 0.6 0.4 -­‐0.02 0.06* -­‐0.05 0.11* 0.12* 0.34* 0.04 0.12* -­‐0.08* 0.28*      
12 Depth** 5.4 3.8 -­‐0.04 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.02 -­‐0.02 0.14* -­‐0.09* -­‐0.04 -­‐0.02 0.11* -­‐0.07*     
13 Valence** 0.43 0.66 -­‐0.07* -­‐0.07* 0.08* -­‐0.04 0.06* 0.1* -­‐0.01 -­‐0.13* 0.21* 0.31* -­‐0.08* 0.1*    
14 Municipal 0.17 0.37 -­‐0.07* -­‐0.05* -­‐0.06* -­‐0.02 -­‐0.03* 0.02 -­‐0.17* -­‐0.07 -­‐0.01 -­‐0.11* -­‐0.14* 0.01 0.1*   
15 Regional 0.52 0.49 -­‐0.03* 0.02 0.07* 0.06 0.26* 0.11* -­‐0.23* 0.11* 0.04* 0.14* 0.12* 0.15* -­‐0.06 -­‐0.5*  
16 Past	  performance 0.05 0.21 0.4* 0.35* 0.1* 0.07* 0.14* 0.34* 0.27* 0.19* 0.1* 0.14* 0.05 0.03 -­‐0.05 -­‐0.05 -­‐0.11* 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
*statistically significant at 0.05 level and below 
** pairwise correlations and statistics are presented for the restricted sample of theaters  
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TABLE 4 - Two stage mixed effects Poisson estimation of the Effect of Relationships with Corporate 
Donors on Peer Recognition (number of nominations) 
     GMM Poisson Poisson Poisson            
 
Poisson  Poisson  Poisson 
   1st stage Baseline Hyp 1 Hyp 2 Hyp 3 Hyp 4 Full 
VARIABLES 
Number of 
donors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Region/city dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age -0.00141*** -0.0014 -0.0004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.0006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size 0.152*** 0.44*** 0.408* 0.21 0.195 0.22 0.22 
 (0.02) (0.173 (0.163) (0.192) (0.188) (0.21) (0.197) 
Category - 0.023 1.13*** 1.06* 1.348* 1.42*** 1.31* 1.48*** 
 (0.632) (0.466) (0.44) (0.544) (0.53) (0.605) (0.57) 
State owned 0.182*** 0.077 1.163 1.34 1.25 1.19 1.08 
 (0.079) (0.056) (0.889) (1.23) (1.18) (1.29) (1.25) 
Celebrity cast 0.274*** 0.431* 0.49* 0.899* 0.74** 1.14*** 0.87* 
 (0.063) (0.154) (0.286) (0.377) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) 
Federal 0.412*** 4.41***         4.84***        4.055*** 3.53*** 4.91*** 4.47*** 
 (0.0006) (1.12)   (1.1)      (1.31) (1.27) (1.49) (1.42) 
Regional 0.31*** 1.68***         1.48+      0.877 0.59 0.66 0.43 
 (0.06) (0.81)      (0.79)      (1.07) (1.03) (1.14) (1.1) 
Municipal -0.072 -0.33       0.199      1.41 1.25 1.39 1.34 
 (0.071) (0.32)       (0.97)       (1.231) (1.19) (1.3) (1.26) 
Past Performance    8.04*** 0.11     0.32          0.453*** 0.36** 1.32** 1.39** 
 (0.15) (0.45) (0.32)   (0.167) (0.15) (0.53) (0.56) 
Board of Trustees 0.13*** 0.3 0.21 0.002 -0.587 0.029 0.027 
 (0.004) (0.3) (0.307) (0.45) (0.57) (0.403) (0.501) 
Density        -0.009*** - - - - - - 
         (0.003)       
Number of profitable firms         0.009* - - - - - - 
        (0.002)       
Salience (N of corporate 
donors) - - -0.149***      -0.138+ 
 
-0.23 -0.569*** -0.21 
   (0.003)      (0.077) (0.22) (0.21) (0.25) 
Breadth (Type of support)15  - -      0.064+ -         - 0.07+ 
 -        (0.037)   (0.04) 
Breadth x Salience   -      -0.331*** - -  -0.467*** 
         (0.081)    (0.09) 
Depth (Longevity of support)   - - 0.08** - 0.05 
     (0.03)  (0.03) 
Depth x Salience   - - -0.03** - -0.02** 
     (0.008)  (0.01) 
Valence (Donors from tainted 
industries)              -  -           - 
 
-0.82** -0.97** 
                (0.37) (0.37) 
Valence x Salience              -          -  -0.19* -0.13 
     - (0.09) (0.1) 
Constant -0.25 -1.123 -3.65***    -8.04*** -6.5***     -6.4***  -6.8*** 
 (0.374) (0.863) -3.029 (1.124) (1.202) (0.198)  (1.1) 
               /lnsig2u            2.17***       1.718*** 1.64*** 1.79 *** 1.69*** 
         (0.222) (0.259) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) 
               sigma_u          2.01 2.36 2.27 2.45 2.33 
         (0.297) (0.306) (0.305) (0.273) (0.311) 
Likelihood ratio test of 
sigma_u=o  806.7 769.5(0.00) 409.1(0.00) 
 
392.6 380.4(0.0) 339.4 (0.00)  
No of endogenous regressors 
(instruments)   1(2) 1(1) 
 
1(1) 1(1) 1(1)  
First stage F-statistic 5.48          
First stage adj R-sq 0.12        
First stage p-values of 
instruments 0.003 (0.04)    
 
  
 
p-value of Hausman end. test  0.08        
Observations 2,987 2,987 2,987 1,105 1,03516 1,105 1,035 
Period 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1, robust standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficient for Poisson 
estimator. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Project-centric type of support is a baseline model (i.e. project-centric support is 0; institution-centric support is 1). 
16 Smaller number of observations is due to a few observations for depth missing at random 
59	  
	  
TABLE 5 
Two stage mixed effect Logit Estimations of the Effect of Relationships with Corporate Donors 
on Peer Recognition (nomination) 
  
Logit 
Hyp1 
Logit 
Hyp 2 
Logit 
Hyp 3 
Logit 
Hyp 4 
 
Logit 
Fulll 
VARIABLES Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 
Full model 
Region/city dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes  
 
Age 0.002 0.006 0.008 
 
0.004 
 
0.005 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size 0.26+ 0.144 0.086 0.102 0.166 
 (0.134) (0.187) (0.171) (0.179) (0.196) 
Category 1.19*** 1.59*** 1.41*** 1.08* 1.37** 
 (0.37) (0.53) (0.49) (0.521) (0.55) 
State owned 0.89 1.7 1.56 1.5 1.4 
 (0.73) (1.22) (1.12) (1.15) (1.2) 
Celebrity cast 1.46*** 1.94***     1.77***     2.12*** 1.93*** 
 (0.37) (0.61) (0.57) (0.59) (0.61) 
Federal 4.7*** 4.2*** 2.81**     3.42*** 3.1** 
 (1.0) (1.46) (1.23) (1.32) (1.33) 
Regional 0.91 0.45 0.26 0.57 0.22 
 (0.64) (1.08) (0.99) (1.03) (1.08) 
Municipal 0.33 1.54 1.42 1.6 1.36 
 (0.79) (1.23) (1.13) (1.17) (1.23) 
Past Performance 2.25*** 1.73* 1.064* 1.05* 1.5*** 
 (0.52) (0.79) (0.43) (0.44) (0.52) 
Board of Trustees  -0.45 -0.39 -0.54 -0.48 0.009 
 (0.57) (0.64) (0.59) (0.64) (0.67) 
Salience (No of corporate donors) -0.71*** 0.027 -0.24 
 
-0.72** 
 
-0.25 
 (0.21) (0.367) (0.3) (0.281) (0.26) 
Breadth (Type of Support) - -0.94 - - -1.01 
  (0.61)   (0.61) 
Breadth x Salience -  -0.82* - 
 
 
 
 
   -1.21** 
  (0.24)   (0.42) 
Depth (Longevity of support) - - 0.004 - -.0.0001 
   (0.08)  (0.08) 
Depth x Salience - - -0.069+ - -0.078+ 
   (0.04)  (0.45) 
Valence (Donors from tainted industries) - - - -0.75+ -0.86+ 
    (0.42) (0.48) 
Valence x Salience - - - -0.044* -0.002 
    (0.021) (0.001) 
Constant      -7.09*** -7.42*** -7.57***   -7.35*** -7.29*** 
        (0.85) (1.38) (1.39) (1.41) (1.44) 
Random effect parameter         1.94 1.92 1.72 1.84 1.9 
 sd(cons)        (0.25) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.36) 
No of endogenous regressors (instruments)                      1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 
Likelihood ratio test         63.2 37.3 27.67 32.9 31.55 
LR test p-value       0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.002 0.000 
Wald statistic        95.71 60.3 62.66 46.41 50.73 
Observations       2,987 1,105 1,035 1,105 1,035 
Period 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
 
2004-2011 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1, robust standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficient for logit estimation	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